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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2017 was marred by the assassination, in Malta, of the investigative journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia, an event which 
represented the darkest hour for media freedom and media pluralism in the European Union since the 2015 Charlie 
Hebdo massacre in France. This crime has profoundly shaken Europe and has had an impact on its image as a bastion of 
human rights and democratic values.
Publishers continued to face significant economic pressures, and 2017 confirmed the decline in the revenues of the press 
sector and of many local and community newspapers across Europe, a worldwide trend signalling continued job losses 
in the sector and the lower viability of the media business as organisations struggle to find sustainable business models 
in the face of digital transformation. 
The spread of online disinformation and hate speech, including concerns about their impact on elections and referenda 
in 2016, represented major areas of debate during 2017. States, international institutions, and private enterprises have 
discussed or adopted measures – both legislative and non-legislative – to address these phenomena, and several of these 
measures have, in turn, raised concerns about their impact on the freedom of expression and respect for the rule of law. 
Due to the aforementioned concerns with regard to the economic difficulties faced by publishers, as well as online hate 
speech and disinformation, 2017 was noteworthy for an increased interest in the analysis of the influence of major online 
platforms in both public debate and public opinion. Queries over accountability, transparency and the overall effect on 
democracy in relation to the digital platforms have escalated. In 2017, several stakeholders expressed concerns about 
such platforms’ use of machine learning and algorithms in personalising news feeds, as well as their use of the end-users’ 
data for targeted advertising purposes.
In recent years, the European Commission has taken steps to tackle the spread of illegal content, hate speech and disin-
formation online. In 2016, some IT platforms committed themselves to the EC’s initiative for a Code of Conduct relating 
to the countering of online hate speech Measures include reviewing flagged content and the removal or disabling of such 
content as is found to be illegal or in violation of the Code, within 24 hours. The agreement with the Commission also 
foresees a reporting and transparency obligation on the part of the online platforms in relation to the implementation of 
the Code.
Another EC initiative involved the setting up of a high-level group of experts to advise on policy initiatives in order to 
counter fake news and the spread of disinformation online. The HLEG was announced in 2017, and it was established in 
January, 2018.1 
---
This report presents the results and the methodology of the 2017 implementation of the Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) 
in the EU-28 countries and in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM), Serbia and Turkey (MPM2017). The 
MPM is a tool developed by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF) at the European University In-
stitute to assess the risks to media pluralism in a given country2. The MPM project is co-funded by the European Union3. 
The MPM focuses its analysis on news and current affairs. Different news media are covered: legacy media (print, radio 
and audiovisual), with their online editions; native digital media (and, to some extent, search engines and social media 
in the context of market plurality). The MPM further considers different types of media: public service, commercial, and 
non-profit community media.
1  The outcome of the work of the Group is a report designed to call for a review of best practices in the light of democratic fundamental 
principles, and to develop adequate policy responses. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-
fake-news-and-online-disinformation.
2  Prior to the 2017 implementation, the tool was  implemented in 2016 and tested through two pilot-projects, which were co-funded by 
the European Union in 2014 and 2015. These two pilot-test implementations were built on the prototype of the MPM that was designed in the 
2009 Independent Study on Indicators of  Media Pluralism in the Member States – Towards a Risk-Based Approach carried out by KU Leuven, 
JIBS, CEU, Ernst & Young, and a team of national experts (http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/media_taskforce/doc/pluralism/pfr_report.
pdf).
3  Prior to the 2017 implementation, the tool was tested through two pilot-projects that were co-funded by the European Union in 2014 
and 2015 (CMPF 2015; CMPF 2016) and that were applied in EU-28 and Montenegro and Turkey in 2016 (CMPF 2017). The two pilot-test 
implementations built on the prototype of the MPM that was designed in the 2009 Independent Study on Indicators for Media Pluralism in the 
Member States – Towards a Risk-Based Approach carried out by KU Leuven, JIBS, CEU, Ernst &Young, and a team of national experts (KU Leu-
ven, 2009).
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The Monitor assesses the risks to media pluralism based on a set of twenty indicators that cover a broad notion of media 
pluralism that encompasses political, cultural, geographical, structural and content related dimensions4. The risks for 
media pluralism are measured in four different areas: Basic Protection, Market Plurality, Political Independence and 
Social Inclusiveness. The indicators cover legal, economic and socio-political questions. 
National experts, composing the MPM network of local teams, provided the data to assess the levels of risk at the country 
level, and drafted the country reports, while the CMPF supervised and guaranteed the quality and consistency of the data 
collection and assessed the levels of risk. The CMPF team also directly implemented the MPM in Italy and Malta. 
The assessment of the risks to media pluralism in a given country by the MPM does not necessarily represent an effective 
lack of pluralism in a given context. The results, the data collected and the analysis provide useful information for poli-
cymakers - both at the national and EU levels - researchers, and civil society, to better understand the threats to media 
pluralism in different media contexts and to plan relevant media policy or advocacy measures, where needed. The results 
of the MPM implementation are presented according to three categories of risk: low, medium and high. The subsequent 
paragraphs provide a short description and the main results per area.
The analysis of the MPM2017 data shows that one area scores an average low risk - although close to medium risk - (Basic 
Protection, 32%), while the other three areas score an average medium risk (Market Plurality, 53%; Political Indepen-
dence, 46%; Social Inclusiveness, 54%). The most prevalent sources of risk detected relate to incomplete information 
- or lack of information - on media ownership; the concentration of ownership; political and commercial pressure on 
editorial content, including through the non transparent distribution of state advertising; the lack of public service me-
dia governance’s independence and funding; inadequate access to media for minorities; and gender inequality in media 
management and content production. In addition, the risks for media pluralism and media freedom in the Basic pro-
tection area result from growing threats to both the physical and digital safety of journalists; and a lack of protection for 
whistle-blowers.
Figure 1 - Basic Protection Area
In the Basic Protection area, the MPM assesses the fundamental factors which must be in place in a plural and demo-
cratic society, namely, the existence and effectiveness of the implementation of regulatory mechanisms in order to safe-
guard the freedom of expression and the right to seek, receive and impart information; the status of journalists in each 
country; the independence and effectiveness of the media authority; the universal reach of traditional media and access 
to the Internet.
In MPM2017 most of the countries analysed score low risk when it comes to the Basic Protection area: 16 of 31 countries 
are assessed as having low risk (namely, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden, United Kingdom); 14 are assessed as hav-
ing medium risk (Bulgaria, Croatia, FYRoM, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, 
Serbia, Slovenia) - with 4 countries moving from low to medium risk (Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia) and 2 countries 
from medium risk to low risk (Austria, Luxembourg) - a decrease  if compared to MPM2016, where 18 out of 30 coun-
4  Commission staff working document - Media pluralism in the Member States of the European Union /* SEC/2007/0032 */ , https:// 
publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/4c7c6eb5-fb51-40f4-9125-33ef824e685b/language-en
CENTRE FOR MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM - Results3
tries were assessed at low risk. Turkey, as in MPM2016, is the only country that scores high risk in this very fundamental 
area. The average score for the area of Basic protection is 32%, a percentage that is very close to the threshold denoting 
medium risk. The higher average score, in comparison to MPM2016 (28%) shows a deterioration in the basic conditions 
required for media pluralism. Particular concerns are raised for Poland as regards criminal defamation. In this country, 
the protection of public officials continues to be supported by the use of Criminal Code procedures against journalistic 
criticism. It must be noted that the 32% average risk is also partly due to the introduction of a few new variables in the 
analysis of the indicators (i.e., the assessment on whistle-blower protection in the indicator on the Right to information) 
and to the higher standards that are used to assess the risks to broadband coverage and access to the Internet. In particu-
lar, the protection of whistle-blowers was found to be at risk in most of the countries analysed (24 countries scored either 
medium or high risk for this sub-indicator, including Luxembourg, which, in 2017, was facing court cases against the 
whistle-blowers in the so called LuxLeaks affair).
Regrettably, 2017 was marked by the assassination of the blogger and investigative journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia 
in Malta. MPM2016 had already referred to certain legal threats, namely defamation cases, which were accompanied by 
the freezing of her bank accounts, which Daphne Caruana Galizia was facing, and the risks to media pluralism in her 
country (Nenadic, 2017). Most of the risk-increasing factors in the MPM2017 for Malta are linked to the assassination of 
Ms Caruana Galizia and the deficiencies in the protection of journalists and whistle-blowers in the country, something 
which her assassination starkly exposed. 
As a general trend, the MPM2017 depicts an alarming situation for journalists and other media actors in most of the 
countries assessed, including Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Romania and Turkey: the working conditions of journalists 
have deteriorated, and journalists are facing all kinds of threats (physical, online and other) that are directed at them 
by citizens, politicians and organised crime. The MPM2017 results point to the fact that several Member States may be 
neglecting their obligations, according to the standards on the safety of journalists from the Council of Europe, imposing 
on states the positive obligation of guaranteeing an enabling environment for journalists to permit them to carry out their 
job without fear.
Turkey scores a high risk for all the indicators in the Basic Protection area. After the attempted coup in 2016, the country 
continued to experience serious threats to freedom of expression and media pluralism, due to the high number of jour-
nalists and intellectuals that are detained, both as a pre-trial measure, or as the result of a judgment that does not comply 
with the basics of the rule of law. 
Figure 2 - Market Plurality Are
In the Market Plurality area, the MPM assesses the risks to media pluralism that are linked to a lack of transparency 
and the concentration of media ownership, commercial and owners’ influence over editorial content, and the economic 
conditions in which the media operate (media viability).
The average score for the area of Market Plurality is 53%, which is slightly higher than it was in the MPM2016 (49%), 
partly due to the changes in some variables, especially in the indicator Transparency of media ownership, and a more 
detailed assessment of the indicator on Media viability.
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As in MPM2016, in 2017 the majority of countries in this area score a medium risk (23 of 31), 6 countries score a high 
risk (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Poland, and Romania), and only 2 countries show a low risk result: 
France and Germany.
Market Plurality has the second highest average risk among the areas of the Monitor, just 1 percent behind the Social 
Inclusiveness area. Media ownership concentration (horizontal) is one of the two indicators of the MPM2017 that overall 
performs worse (66%), with no country scoring a low risk in this regard, as in MPM2016. Commercial and owner influ-
ence over editorial content continues to be an issue of concern for most EU countries and for the three EU candidates 
under consideration, although it has registered a small decrease in terms of risk if compared to MPM2016.
The result of the indicators in MPM2017 confirms that market concentration is a source of medium or high risk for 
media pluralism in all of the EU countries, without exception. The economic difficulties of different traditional media 
outlets, which are illustrated by several indicators, especially horizontal and cross-media concentration and media via-
bility, suggest that media concentration is a phenomenon that is unlikely to recede in the future. In particular, as different 
types of media will continue to merge in an attempt to survive economically in the face of reduced resources, a possible 
decline in market plurality remains an ubiquitous element of risk for the MPM project to monitor and investigate in the 
EU countries.
Figure 3 - Political Independence area
Political Independence is assessed using indicators that evaluate the extent of the politicisation of the media system, 
media organizations, newsrooms, media reporting and the public service media. 
The year 2017 brought no major changes in the results of the MPM in the area of Political Independence. The vast major-
ity of the countries examined continue to score a medium risk (18), 9 are at low risk (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), and 4 are found to be at high risk from political 
interference: Turkey and three EU member states, namely, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. 
Turkey is the only country that scores high risks for all five indicators in this area, and the lack of political independence 
is of highest concern there. The candidate countries Serbia and FYRoM score, respectively, a high and medium risk over-
all, although the independence of the public service media in FYRoM also results in a high risk score.
Overall, for all 31 countries examined, most risks in the area of Political Independence relate to a general lack of political 
independence of the media, and this results either from the non-existence of regulations to prevent conflicts of interest, 
or from their poor implementation, as well as from other indirect means of political control over the media, including 
state advertising. Public service media, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, are at risk of government interference 
through the appointment of politically dependent management. Moreover, editorial autonomy in most countries is not 
well protected, either by regulation or by self-regulation.
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Figure 4 - Social Inclusiveness area
The Social Inclusiveness area considers access to the media by various social and cultural groups, such as minorities, 
local/regional communities, people with disabilities, and women. In addition, the Monitor considers media literacy as a 
precondition for using media effectively, and examines media literacy contexts, as well as the digital skills of the popu-
lation.
On average, the area of Social Inclusiveness scores the highest risk (54%) among the four areas, but it is still in a medium 
risk band. Two thirds of the countries (21) score a medium risk, 6 countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus, FYRoM, Greece, Luxem-
bourg, and Turkey) score a high risk, and 4 countries (Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden) are at low risk. 
The highest scoring indicator in this area, and the only one within the MPM2017 that results in the high risk band, is 
access to media for women. Only two countries score a low risk on this indicator - Denmark and Sweden. In almost half 
of the countries (15) women are either not represented on PSM management boards, or their share is 29% or lower. The 
results are even more worrisome at the top executive positions: in 22 of the 31 countries these posts are occupied by men 
only. 
Access to media for minorities also continues to be an area of concern. In the majority of countries (17), minorities seem 
not to have adequate access to airtime, which results in a high risk score. This re-confirms the results of the MPM2016 
and suggests that no progress on this matter was made during 2017. 
These results, to a large extent, confirm the trends that were highlighted in MPM2016. Overall, in comparison to 
MPM2016, the average risk level scores per area have been rising, with the exception of the Political Independence area, 
where there is no difference to MPM2016 (the risk level remained at 46%). This general shift to higher scores is partially 
due to the changes in the research methodology for a limited number of indicators, especially in the Social Inclusiveness 
area (see Part 2 of this Report), but, mostly, to the effective deterioration of some legal and socio-political conditions for 
freedom of expression and media freedom in the countries analysed. 
It should be pointed out that the MPM2017 data collection covers the period January 1, 2017, to December 31, 2017 
and does not, therefore, include the murders of the Slovak investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his partner Marina 
Kušnírova. This was a terrible crime and an unacceptable threat to media freedom that occurred in Slovakia in February, 
2018. At the time of his murder Kuciak was investigating connections between Slovak politicians and Italian organised 
crime.
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INTRODUCTION
Freedom of expression, independent journalism and media freedom and pluralism constitute the foundations of any 
democratic society, since they are considered to be prerequisites that guarantee that individuals have access to a variety of 
information and may form their opinions by taking into account the different perspectives and views which allow them 
to effectively participate in public discourse as informed citizens. Article 11 of the European Union’s Charter of Funda-
mental Rights lays down that the freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected. The protection and promotion 
of pluralism and the freedom of the media are essential in guaranteeing a democratic environment for all EU citizens, for 
the legitimacy of the Union as a whole, and for the health of democracies.
In 2017, the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom carried out the second EU-wide implementation of the 
Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM). The 2017 MPM implementation also covers three candidate countries, for a total of 
31 countries (EU-28, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM), Serbia and Turkey). The CMPF decided to 
cover Turkey for the second consecutive year with the purpose of monitoring the situation in a country that has recently 
been facing a dramatic crackdown on media freedom Further, the CMPF extended the research to two new candidate 
countries, Serbia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as recent events there have highlighted that freedom 
of expression and media freedom and pluralism are facing particular challenges in the current political climate, as was 
also mentioned by the relevant EC Progress Reports on these two countries.
The research design of the Monitor is based on a tested tool5 including a sophisticated questionnaire that was filled in 
following a common and rigorous methodology that was utilised by national country teams made up of experts in me-
dia pluralism and media freedom. A second group of experts, including national stakeholders and experts in the area, 
conducted a review of the selected answers that require a qualitative type of measurement and/or that lack measurable 
and easily verifiable data. In order to ensure the comparability of the answers and the consistency of their quality, the 
CMPF centrally monitored the data collection and raised questions in cases where inconsistent or incomplete answers 
were provided by the country teams. This central control activity proved to be essential in a cross-national study of this 
size and type.
The MPM assesses the risks to media pluralism by considering four areas of risk:
 • Basic Protection
 • Market Plurality
 • Political Independence
 • Social Inclusiveness
All of which take into account the data that are grouped in 20 indicators.
 
5  See the MPM pilot tests in 2014 and 2015 and the 2016 implementation in EU-28 and two candidate countries http://cmpf.eui.eu/
media-pluralism-monitor/
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Basic Protection Market Plurality Political Indepen-
dence
Social Inclusiveness
Protection of freedom 
of expression
Transparency of media 
ownership
Political independence 
of media
Access to media for minorities
Protection of right to 
information
Media ownership concen-
tration (horizontal)
Editorial autonomy
 
 
Access to media for local/regional 
communities and for community 
media
Journalistic profession, 
standards and protec-
tion
Cross-media concentration 
of ownership and competi-
tion enforcement
Media and democratic 
electoral process
Access to media for people with 
disabilities
Independence and ef-
fectiveness of the media 
authority
Commercial & owner influ-
ence over editorial content
State regulation of 
resources and support 
for the media sector
Access to media for women
 
Universal reach of tradi-
tional media and access 
to the Internet
Media viability
 
 
Independence of 
PSM governance and 
funding
Media literacy
 
 
 
It must be acknowledged that, for the 2017 exercise, CMPF has modified the composition of some indicators, in order 
to deepen the analysis of certain topics and to further improve the quality of the questionnaire, taking into account the 
greater role played by the online dimension in media pluralism, and to collect data on issues that are increasingly import-
ant for the detection of risks to media pluralism in the new online environment. In particular, therefore, for indicators 
under the Social Inclusiveness area, the results are not fully comparable with MPM2016 (see below 2.2 Research and 
fine-tuning of the variables).
Moreover, it must be noted that the MPM is not a ranking instrument but a scientific tool, comprising many dimensions 
of risk analysis that are related to the pluralism of the media in a country, and it can provide indications that are of rele-
vance to policy choices. Its results must be read in the specific context of the country analysed. Each indicator is the result 
of the assessment of numerous variables and sub-indicators and, in many cases, the granular data at the level of variables 
and sub-indicators explain and provide a more nuanced analysis and explanation of the assessment for a specific indica-
tor. We invite the reader to consult the narrative country reports for more detail.
The focus of the MPM is not solely on the detection of the deficiencies of a country-specific media environment: it also 
provides an analysis of the structural conditions of the media system in a given constitutional, economic and socio-polit-
ical context. The rationale behind the Media Pluralism Monitor is the identification of concrete indicators to objectively 
assess the levels of risks for media pluralism in a given country. “Risk assessment” is taken to mean “a systematic ana-
lytical process based on predetermined risk criteria, professional judgment and experience to determine the probability 
that an adverse condition will occur”6. This analysis is, then, balanced against the available data that constitute a form of 
“reality check,” thereby allowing an assessment of the situation for a given country with regard to both the conditions that 
are conducive to either more or less pluralism, and the actual situation on the ground of each country (Brogi and Parcu, 
2018). This approach differentiates MPM from other indices and ranking instruments, which privilege events that, in a 
specific time frame and in a country context, have affected journalists and other media actors7.
The MPM2017 data collection covers the period January 1, 2017, to December 31, 2017, which means that this assess-
ment does not cover the murders of the Slovak investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and of his partner Marina Kušnírova, 
which occurred in Slovakia in February, 2018. 
6  Commission staff working document - Media pluralism in the Member States of the European Union /* SEC/2007/0032 */, 16.12007. 
Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52007SC0032&from=EN
7  For instance, the index of Reporters without Borders gives relevance and weight to the data on abuses on journalists and media actors, 
reflected in the final score and ranking position.
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1. ANALYSIS
1.1 ANALYSIS OF BASIC PROTECTION
The indicators that fall under the area of Basic Protection are designed to describe and measure the elements that are essen-
tial conditions for a pluralistic and democratic society. The first and fundamental component of the area is the level of ‘Pro-
tection of freedom of expression’, a very basic prerequisite for any functioning democracy. Freedom of expression is necessary 
for individual dignity and fulfilment and “constitutes [an] essential foundation for democracy, rule of law, peace, stability, 
sustainable inclusive development and participation in public affairs”8 Along with freedom of expression, and stemming 
from it, the right to access information is another fundamental ingredient of democracy. It is of the utmost importance that 
the effective transparency of public administrations is guaranteed and that information which is in the public interest can 
be circulated to feed the political debate and, in the end, democracy. Whether it is important that freedom of expression and 
freedom of information are effectively safeguarded, a free and plural media environment must rely also on free journalism. 
This means that access to the journalistic profession should be open, that journalists should be able to obtain decent working 
conditions and should be able to work without constraints. An “enabling environment”9 allowing journalists and other me-
dia actors to freely express themselves without fear, even when their opinions are contrary to those held by the authorities or 
by a significant section of public opinion, should be guaranteed by member states. The MPM therefore considers the safety 
of journalists, both physical and digital, as a parameter through which to assess whether the basic conditions for a plural 
media environment are fulfilled. The impartiality and independence of the institutions that oversee the media market are 
other basic elements for a plural media environment. The independence of media authorities is of paramount importance 
when implementing media specific regulation and media policy, as the shape of the market has a direct impact on market 
plurality. Finally, the Basic Protection area includes an assessment of the universal reach of traditional media and access to 
the Internet. These are conditions that contribute to the assessment of whether citizens have, or at least potentially have, ac-
cess to a wide variety of content. The indicators aim to capture risks in relation to specific legal standards, by measuring both 
the existence of legislation in a given area and its implementation. In addition to this, the Monitor assesses what the effective 
socio-political conditions are that practically affect the specific area of investigation.
Summarising, the five indicators under Basic Protection are:
 
•	 Protection of freedom of expression
•	 Protection of right to information
•	 Journalistic profession, standards and protection
•	 Independence and effectiveness of the media authority
•	 Universal reach of traditional media and access to the Internet
 
In 2017, 16 countries scored a low risk in the area of Basic Protection, namely, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovakia, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom; 14 scored a medium risk (Bulgaria, Croatia, FYRoM, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain) and 1 country, Turkey, scored a high risk. 
Overall, the majority of the EU countries still fall within the low risk assessment in this area, but the number of coun-
tries assessed as being at medium risk has, nonetheless, increased if compared to the previous analysis. In MPM2016, 18 
countries scored a low risk, 11 a medium risk, and 1 (Turkey, as in MPM2017) a high risk. The higher number of coun-
tries assessed to be at medium risk, and the generally higher scores, explain why the Basic Protection area’s overall score 
shows an average risk of 32% in 2017, which still means a low risk, but falls within its upper band and is alarmingly close 
to the medium risk range. Most of the medium-risk countries are the same ones that received a similar score in 2016, ex-
cept for Luxembourg and Austria which, in 2017, had a lower scores of, respectively, 31% and 29%: the score for Austria 
benefits from the introduction of the sub-indicator on whistle-blowers under the Indicator on the Protection of right to 
8  Council of the EU, EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline, 12 May 2014, http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142549.pdf.
9  ECtHR, case Dink v. Turkey, 2668/07, 6102/08, 30079/08, 7072/09 et 7124/09, Judgment on September 14, 2010. See also Council of 
Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4[1] of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the protection of 
journalism and the safety of journalists and other media actors, https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=09000016806415d9
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information. Based on the MPM data collection, Austria seems to have an effective regulatory framework in relation to 
whistle-blowers. As regards Luxembourg, the MPM detects a positive element in the Luxembourgish legislation, as there 
is a regulatory framework in place for whistle-blowers, even if the MPM country team for Luxembourg acknowledges 
that it may not be effective10. The law “is considered to be too restrictive, because it is mainly limited to cases of corrup-
tion, trading in influence, or money laundering, and the protection can concern only employment relationships” (Kies 
and Schall and al 2018).
In MPM2017, Italy shifts from being a low- to being a medium risk, and receives an average score of 36% in the Basic 
protection area, reporting an alarming assessment on the status of journalists (in particular, in relation to journalists’ 
physical safety): the same result applies to Malta, where the score has been raised by the assassination of Daphne Caruana 
Galizia. Portugal and Slovenia also shifted from low- to medium risk for various reasons, including the absence of any 
law on blowing -thewhistle . Portugal also shows a poor performance in terms of DTT coverage and implementation 
of net neutrality rules, while Slovenia reported some risks when the independence of the media authority was assessed. 
Serbia and FYRoM, two of the three candidate countries that are encompassed by the MPM2017, are assessed as being at 
medium risk (reducing to 12 the EU member states that are assessed as being in the medium band).
Figure 1.1.1. Basic Protection area - Map of risks per country
In regard to the indicators in the Basic Protection area, the overall situation remains comparable to that of MPM2016. 
The only indicator that had had a considerable increase in the average risk is the one on the Protection of right to in-
formation (42%), and this was mostly due to the inclusion of a new important sub-indicator on the protection of whis-
tle-blowers. The indicators that present higher risks in the Basic Protection area in MPM2017 are the Protection of the 
Right to Information and the Universal reach of traditional media and access to the Internet, both scoring, on average, 
a medium risk.
10  The status of whistle-blowers has been at the centre of many debates in recent years in Luxembourg, due to the so called “LuxLeaks 
affair”. On March 15, 2017, Antoine Deltour and Raphaël Halet, the two whistle-blowers in the case, were recognized as alert launchers and were, 
at the same time, sentenced to jail with suspended sentences and were fined €1,000 and €1,500, raising questions about the effective recogni-
tion of the status of an alert launcher. In January, 2018, Luxembourg’s highest court overturned the verdict for Deltour and fully recognised 
him as a whistle-blower. The Luxleaks whistle-blower Antoine Deltour has seen his conviction quashed https://www.bbc.com/news/world-eu-
rope-42652161. Raphael Halet’s sentence of a €1,000 fine was upheld by the court.
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Figure 1.1.2. Basic Protection area - Averages per indicator
The assessment relating to the indicator on the Protection of freedom of expression shows a 25% average risk, meaning 
that it is low risk. The assessment is similar to the 24% that resulted from MPM2016. Freedom of expression is, in general, 
protected, but the international standards in that regard are particularly neglected in some of the assessed countries when 
it comes to a proportionate balance between protection of freedom of expression and dignity and, in some cases, respect 
for the rule of law as regards freedom of expression online. The criminalization of defamation raises concerns in Poland. 
In particular, this is due to the fact that “Protection of public officials continues to be supported by the use of Criminal 
Code procedures against journalistic criticism” (Klimkiewicz, 2018).
Within this very essential indicator, around two-thirds of the countries (22) score within the low risk range. Again, as in 
MPM2016, only Turkey is assessed as being in the high risk range. FYRoM and Serbia are assessed as being at medium 
risk for this indicator, while Turkey scores a high risk. This explains the sensibly higher average for the EU28 +3 candi-
dates, as shown in Figure 1.1.2. 
The increase in risk for the indicator on the Protection of Right to Information, in comparison to MPM2016 (average 
low risk), is mostly due to the inclusion, within the composition of the indicator, of the sub-indicator on the Protection 
of whistle-blowers. There are 2 countries that score an overall high risk for the indicator on the Protection of Right to 
Information, namely, Turkey, because of the many exemptions to access to information that are provided in the law, and 
Luxembourg, as the country has no law on the access to information, 20 countries score a medium risk (Austria, the 
Czech Republic, Finland, FYRoM, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, the United Kingdom, Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Cro-
atia, Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Malta, Spain, Estonia, Latvia, Portugal) and just 9 countries score a low risk (Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Ireland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Serbia, Sweden).
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The decrease in the percentage of risk for the indicator on the Journalistic profession must be interpreted in the light 
of some changes in the composition of the indicator itself. The score modification is mostly due to the inclusion of two 
new variables: on arbitrary arrests or imprisonments, and on the killings of journalists because of the exercise of their 
profession, which, in most countries, reduced the risks for this indicator (as explained in the methodology part of this 
report - see Part 2.), except in the case of Malta and Turkey. As a consequence of the killing of Daphne Caruana Galizia, a 
blogger and investigative journalist in 2017, the risk for this indicator increased from low to medium risk in Malta11; and, 
as a consequence of the imprisonment of many journalists after the attempted coup of July 2016, the risk also increased 
in Turkey.
From the data analysis of MPM2017 it is possible to assess a stable and positive trend in relation to the indicator on 
Independence and the effectiveness of the media authority, which scores as a low risk in 23 countries (in MPM2016, 24 
countries scored as being low risk for this indicator). Nonetheless, as shown in Figure 1.1.2, it must be noted that the 
difference between the average of EU28 and the average of all the 31 countries under analysis is quite important. Again, 
FYRoM and Serbia are assessed as being in the medium risk band and Turkey in the high risk one. The particularly high 
score for Turkey (80%) raises the average for this indicator.
The increase in the percentage of risk for the indicator on the Universal reach of traditional media and access to the In-
ternet, in comparison to MPM2016, can be explained by the fact that the MPM2017 assessment is based on thresholds 
that are very demanding and that are tailored to an already developed environment in terms of connectivity. It must be 
noted also that a few countries also received a high score because they were not assessed as being fully compliant with the 
EU Regulation on Open Internet (net neutrality).
11  The MPM2017 application covers the 1st January, 2017, -31 December 2017, time frame, adthat is why it does not refer to the murder 
of Ján Kuciak, journalist, and of his partner Marina Kušnírova,, who were shot dead in Slovakia in February, 2018.
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PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Freedom of expression is considered to be the cornerstone of democracy. Freedom of the press, freedom of the media, the right 
to access information - are essential conditions for a public sphere dialogue in which public opinion is based upon the free 
exchange of information and opinions – and they stem from freedom of expression. In addition to this, freedom of expression 
also ‘enables’ other rights, like the right of assembly, the right to join a political party, the right to vote. Its protection is thus 
at the very core of any democratic society. EU member states share, and are bound to, the respect of freedom of expression 
as it is enshrined in Art 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and as it is at the core of their common constitutional 
traditions. It is also a right that has been effectively promoted under the Enlargement and Accession process (Brogi, Dobreva 
and Parcu, 2014), and by the Council of Europe’s framework for the protection of human rights (Voorhoof, 2014).
The indicator on the Protection of freedom of expression under the MPM2017 aims to assess the existence and effective 
implementation of the regulatory safeguards for freedom of expression in a given country. A country may have good laws 
protecting the freedom of expression, but they may not be implemented or enforced effectively. Sometimes, constitutional 
guarantees and international treaty obligations may be eroded by exceptions and derogations, or by other laws that may 
limit the freedom of expression in an arbitrary way. In order to assess the levels of protection for the freedom of expression, 
the MPM uses the standards developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) under the interpretation of Art. 10 
of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). According to these parameters, freedom of expression must be pro-
tected under the rule of law: restrictive measures should have a legal basis in domestic law, should be accessible to the person 
concerned and foreseeable in its effects; limitations must have a “legitimate aim” and be “necessary in a democratic society”. 
The ECtHR has interpreted the scope of freedom of expression broadly, as it is considered essential for the functioning of a 
democratic society: “the dynamic interpretation, by the Court, of what is to be considered ‘necessary in a democratic society’ 
together with the limitation of the ‘margin of appreciation’ by the member states, has been crucial for the impact of Article 10 
of the Convention on the protection of freedom of expression in Europe” (Voorhoof, 2014).
This indicator also includes a sub-indicator that specifically relates to defamation laws. While defamation laws are an im-
portant tool in protecting people from false statements that damage their reputation, such laws can easily be misused and 
the criminalization of defamation may pose risks for the freedom of expression, producing a chilling effect on journalistic 
freedom. Journalists, instead, should enjoy a position in which they can exercise their job without fear.
Online violations of freedom of expression are growing in frequency and importance. Another element that is therefore taken 
into account in the indicator is whether freedom of expression online is limited on the same grounds as freedom of expression 
offline. In this regard, the indicator takes into account whether Art 10 of the ECHR is respected, and, in particular, whether 
restrictive measures resulting in blocking, removing and filtering online content comply with Art. 10.2 ECHR (i.e., limitations 
on freedom of expression are prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim, and are necessary in a democratic society). The in-
dicator also takes into consideration whether filtering and blocking practices by Internet service and content providers, and 
by a given state, are arbitrarily limiting the freedom of expression online.
The Indicator on the Protection of freedom of expression scores as a low risk in 22 countries (3 countries fewer than in 
MPM2016) namely, Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, while 8 countries score a medium risk (Bulgaria, FYRoM, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, 
Spain). Turkey is assessed as being at high risk. It must be noted, however, that the average of all the 31 countries ana-
lysed is significantly higher than the average of the scores of the EU-28 countries (25% vs 22%). While Turkey scores a 
very high risk of 82%, Serbia (48%) and FYRoM (35%) score as being at medium risk, contributing to a higher general 
average score (the average of the three candidate countries examined is 55%). The results of MPM2017 for this indicator 
are essentially similar to those resulting from MPM2016.
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Figure 1.1.3. Indicator on the Protection of freedom of expression - Map of risks per country
Constitutional and legal protection for the freedom of expression is formally guaranteed in all the countries considered 
under the MPM2017. It is enshrined in all of their constitutions and/or in the national laws. As a general trend, the rele-
vant international human rights conventions, which are particularly relevant for freedom of expression standard setting, 
namely, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, Art 19) and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR, Art 10), have been ratified with no particular exemptions, with only Malta having two significant 
reservations to Article 19 of the ICCPR, as highlighted in the MPM2016 general report12 (see also Nenadic, 2018). It is 
important to highlight that France13 and Turkey maintain the derogation from certain rights that are guaranteed by the 
European Convention on Human Rights, due to the states of emergency decreed in those countries following, respective-
ly, the terrorist attacks in France and the coup d’état in Turkey (Art 15 ECHR).
The main differences between the various legal systems in this area are to be found in the limitations to the freedom of 
expression that are allowed under each constitution, or in special laws, and in the proportionality of the specific lim-
itations on the basis of interests of “national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing 
the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary” 
(Art. 10(2), ECHR). Countries that are assessed as being at medium risk usually have a satisfactory or solid regulatory 
framework in place, which is in line with international standards, but they demonstrate poor implementation, which, in 
practice, leads to systematic violations of the exercise of freedom of expression.
12  Malta has made two peculiar and significant reservations to Article 19 of the ICCPR that may affect the assessment of the risks for 
freedom of expression in the country, declaring that Article 19 ICCPR does not affect the Constitutional provision that allows for restrictions 
on the freedom of expression of public officials, as long as such restrictions are “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society”. According to the 
Code of Conduct of Public Officers in Malta, public officers are precluded from taking an active part in political discussions, or in other political 
activity, during working hours or at the workplace. Malta also reserved the right not to apply Article 19, to the extent that non-application is fully 
compatible with domestic legislation that regulates “the limitations on the political activities of aliens”, and in accordance with Article 16 of the 
ECHR (Restrictions on the political activity of aliens). 
13  France formally lifted the “état d’urgence’ on November 1st, 2017, but some derogations from the rights guaranteed by the ECHR were 
transposed to the new anti-terrorism law (Loi 2017-1510), which was adopted on 30 October, 2017. See, for instance, https://www.ouest-france.fr/
terrorisme/fin-de-l-etat-d-urgence-les-4-mesures-qui-ne-disparaitront-pas-5349720. 
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Figure 1.1.4. Indicator on Protection of freedom of expression - Averages per sub-indicator
It is not surprising, therefore, that, in the detailed analysis of the components of the indicator, the sub-indicator that 
scored the highest risk is, once again, the one relating to the Proportionate balance between the protection of freedom of 
expression and dignity (33%), although there has been a slight improvement if scores are compared to MPM2016 (35%), 
which is mostly due to the fact that 2 variables of this sub-indicator were merged in MPM2017. Under this sub-indicator, 
4 countries scored a high risk (Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Turkey), 9 countries a medium risk (Austria, Czech Republic, 
Finland, FYRoM, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovenia), and among the countries that score a low risk, 2 (Cro-
atia and Spain) are in the highest range of low risk and are almost at medium risk (33%). In particular, all countries have 
legislation on defamation, but the scope of it varies from country to country, and the limitations on the grounds of hon-
our and reputation are often shaped in laws that are not fully homogeneous or comparable and so may not be consistent 
with international standards relating to the freedom of expression (CMPF, 2017). Imprisonment for defamation (libel) 
is possible in most EU member states (even if not often implemented, in practice), along with pecuniary sanctions; high 
damages requests are very common remedies to libel in cases of civil defamation. Among the countries that score highest, 
Poland should be singled out, given that while most sentences result in a fine, or community service, there have also been 
cases in which the courts handed down suspended sentences of deprivation of liberty. It must be added that the crucial 
role in deciding on the legitimate use of restrictions on the freedom of expression in Poland is played by the common 
courts and the Constitutional Tribunal. In recent years, both the Constitutional Tribunal and the common courts have 
undergone legal reform, which has raised broad concerns about judicial independence14 (see Klimkiewicz 2018).
Defamation laws, particularly Penal Code Article 299 (Insult to the President) and Article 301 (Insulting Turkishness) 
are problematic for press freedom in Turkey. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe recommended to reform 
them, pointing to the “vague wording” of the law. The request was repeated by a CoE Parliamentary Assembly debate on 
25 April, 201715.
According to the BİA Media Monitoring Report, between April and June, 2017, two journalists were standing trial in 
defamation cases and were facing a total of 9 years and 4 months in prison16. In the same period, 18 journalists stood 
14  In  July 2017 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2205_en.htm) the Commission launched an infringement procedure on the 
“Polish Law on Ordinary Courts”, also on the grounds of its impact on the independence of the judiciary. In December, 2017, the Commission 
triggered Article 7(1)’s procedure for the first time, and submitted to the Council a Reasoned Proposal in accordance with Art. 7(1) of the Treaty 
of the European Union regarding the rule of law in Poland  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5367_en.htm . See, also http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-18-5830_en.htm 
15  “The functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey”, Parliamentary Assembly, 25.04.2017, http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/
Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=23665&lang=en
16  MPM2017 data collection for Turkey.
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trial on the charge of “Defaming President Erdoğan”: nine of these were sentenced to 4 years, 5 months and 20 days in 
prison, as well as punitive fines17.
Within the Protection of freedom of expression, the MPM analyses also whether the freedom of expression online is for-
mally guaranteed and respected, in practice. This specific focus is interesting, since it gives an overview of how different 
countries interpret and apply the rule of law for the freedom of expression online. In general, the laws are not specifically 
drafted to protect the freedom of expression online: according to international standards, online expression should be 
limited to the same grounds and extent as offline expression. Nonetheless, this may lead to an incoherent enforcement of 
the provisions relating to restrictions online, to a different set of remedies to tackle illegal content online, as well as to a 
lack of predictability and the foreseeable consequences of expression online. The sub-indicator on guarantees of the free-
dom of expression online seeks to analyse whether restrictive measures, such as blocking, filtering and removing online 
content, comply with the three conditions set by Article 10(2) ECHR, namely, that limitations on the freedom of expres-
sion are prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim that is foreseen in Article 10(2) ECHR, and that are are necessary in 
a democratic society according to the case-law of the ECtHR. Another aim of the sub-indicator is to collect information 
on, and to assess the risks stemming from, the blocking and filtering practices of governments and online intermediaries. 
It must be noted that, in 2016, at EU level, the Commission agreed a Code of Conduct on combatting illegal hate speech, 
which was signed by major IT companies, thus delegating to private online platforms the removal or blocking of access 
to content that is deemed to be illegal hate speech by those platforms themselves18.
The sub-indicator on the Guarantees of Freedom of Expression online is the one at the lowest risk within this indicator, 
with 8 countries scoring a medium risk level (Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania) and/or high risk 
(Serbia and Turkey). Among relevant developments on this issue, the German NetzDG, Network Enforcement Act, 
which was adopted in 2017, requires social network companies (including Facebook, Twitter and Google) to remove 
content that is considered illegal, according to the German Criminal Code, within 24 hours of it being brought to their 
attention. This law, undoubtedly, is a first attempt to respond to the massive spread of illegal content online, but it was 
criticised for delegating the interpretation and the enforcement of some articles of the Criminal Code to private com-
panies19. Nonetheless, the law foresees a monitoring mechanism on the implementation: platforms are obliged (Section 
2 of the Network Enforcement Act) to report bi-annually on the implementation of the law (first results expected in the 
second half of 2018).
 Other countries that scored a medium risk have seen convictions for insults on Facebook (Bulgaria), a lack of clarity 
in the rules that are applicable to the online environment and the use of criminal defamation proceedings. In Poland, 
journalists and media professionals are facing political pressure and self-censorship seems to grow when controversial 
issues are at stake20 (Klimkiewicz 2018). Turkey scored a high risk for this sub-indicator, with very high risks reported 
for all the variables that compose it, which confirms its outlier position in comparison with the other countries assessed. 
According to the data collection, the high risk detected in Serbia is mostly due to the role of social media and search 
engines as parallel structures that arbitrarily remove online content without any judicial review: this is an element that 
is not clearly acknowledged in other countries, but which may be considered to be a feature to be further analysed and 
researched, also in the light of recent developments in EU policy in that regard. It must be noted, nonetheless, that data 
on this sub-indicator are not available for all of the MPM2017 31 countries: it is very difficult indeed to have sound and 
transparent information on what types of online content the member states and the private intermediaries are blocking, 
filtering and removing21. 
17  According to the CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists) in 2017, “Despite releasing some journalists in 2017, Turkey remains the 
world’s worst jailer for the second consecutive year, with 73 journalists behind bars.” https://cpj.org/reports/2017/12/journalists-prison-jail-re-
cord-number-turkey-china-egypt.php 
18  Code of conduct to counter hate speech online, http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=54300. The implementa-
tion of the Code is regularly assessed. IT companies and the European Commission agreed to discuss ways to promote transparency and encour-
age counter and alternative narratives online.
19  See “OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media warns Germany social networks law could have disproportionate effect.”https://
www.osce.org/fom/347651; Germany: Draft Bill on Social Networks Raises Serious Free Expression Concerns, https://www.coe.int/en/web/me-
dia-freedom/all-alerts/-/soj/alert/25419466 
Art. 19, Germany: The Act to Improve the Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks, https://www.article19.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/09/170901-Legal-Analysis-German-NetzDG-Act.pdf Will Germany’s new law kill free speech online? https://www.bbc.com/news/
blogs-trending-41042266
20  From the MPM2017 Poland (data collection): the case illustrating this uncertainty is the termination of the news blog mediainside.
pl on 17 August, 2017, due to the publication of information on its blog about the firing of Marzena Paczuska and the appointment of Jarosław 
Olechowski as the editor-in-chief of the main national news programme of Polish public television (Wiadomości – the News). Mediainside.
pl apologised to those quoted in their account and published an official statement: “To our great sadness, it seems that in the newest history of 
Poland, it is impossible to write freely even about the media, without political backing”
21  It will be interesting, therefore, to check whether transparency obligations under the EC Code of Conduct to counter hate speech 
may be useful in collecting data, at the national level also, and to better understand the final impact on the freedom of expression of this type of 
self-regulatory initiative.
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As previously said, Turkey is the only state that scored a high risk for this very basic indicator on the protection of free-
dom of expression (82%). According to Inceoglu et al (2018), “the Anti-terror Law (TMK, no. 3713 of 1991) and the re-
lated articles of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) are interpreted and applied in ways that impede the freedom of expression 
of Members of Parliament, academics and journalists. Based on the Anti-Terror law and the Penal Code, journalists are 
charged with “being a member of an armed organisation”, with “propagandising for an illegal organisation”, with “form-
ing an illegal organisation”, “participating in the coup” and “targeting the unity of the state and the integrity of the coun-
try”. The judiciary seems to have been captured by political power and its decisions appear not to follow the rule of law. 
This was the case, for instance, in the trial against the journalist Mehmet Altan, who was abusively imprisoned for a long 
period. The judging tribunal simply ignored a decision from the Turkish Constitutional Court, which had previously 
established that his pre-trial detention, prolonged for longer than a year, had violated his rights to freedom and personal 
security, as well as his freedom of expression. On this basis, the Court had established that he should be released immedi-
ately, but the lower tribunal not only decided not to apply this decision but finally condemned him to life imprisonment22.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22  Mehmet Altan was temporarily released in June, 2018, after 21 months of imprisonment. On 20 March, 2018, the European Court of 
Human Rights ruled that his rights under the European Convention on Human Rights had been violated (Art. 5 Right to liberty and security, and 
Art.10 - Freedom of expression).
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PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION
The indicator on the Protection of the right to information is designed to assess the existence and effective implementation 
of regulatory safeguards in relation to access to information and to the protection of whistle-blowers, this latter being a new 
sub-indicator that is included in MPM2017. Hence, it aims to assess one of the building blocks of media freedom and espe-
cially investigative journalism. The indicator, as in the past MPM editions, focuses on the right of access to information that 
is held by public authorities and the state, the lawfulness of its limitations, as well as the existence and effectiveness of appeal 
mechanisms in cases where there is the denial of access to information. The indicator is based on the principle that all infor-
mation in the hands of the State belongs to the public, with limited and qualified exceptions that must be justified by the State 
authorities. The indicator has also been enhanced by a sub-indicator on whistle-blowers’ protection, which aims to under-
stand whether, in a given country, legislation on the topic exists, whether it is implemented in practice and whether the coun-
try is free from arbitrary sanctioning of whistle-blowers. Based on the standards of the Council of Europe, (Recommendation 
CM/Rec (2014)7 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the protection of whistle-blowers) a “whistle-blower” is 
“any person who reports or discloses information on a threat or harm to the public interest in the context of their work-based 
relationship, whether it be in the public or private sector.”23 Whistle-blowing is fundamental to journalists in shedding light 
on wrongdoing in the workplace (e.g.. corruption, fraud), and in exposing situations that are harmful to the public interest. 
Whistle-blowers should be protected, as they need specific channels so as to be able to expose their case without fear, and as 
their actions potentially expose them to negative personal consequences.
Figure 1.1.5. Indicator on the Protection of the right to information - Map of risks per country
The indicator on the protection of the right to information scores an average of 42% risk, reaching a medium risk level, 
which is quite alarming in the Basic Protection area. It must be noted that, in comparison to the MPM2016, this indicator 
increased from 24% to 42%, mostly due to the inclusion of a new sub-indicator that assesses the risks that are linked to 
the lack of Protection for whistle-blowers.
With this change in the methodology, the majority of countries ended up scoring a medium risk (20 countries -(Austria, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, FYRoM, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Portugal, Lithuania, Mal-
ta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the United Kingdom), with 2 at high risk (Luxembourg and Turkey), 
and only 9 countries scoring a low risk (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Serbia, the Netherlands, 
Sweden). This highlights a specific problem related to whistle-blowers protection standards in the analysed countries.
23 https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=09000016805c5ea5
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Figure 1.1.6. Indicator on Protection of the right to information - Averages per sub-indicator
The sub-indicator on the Legal protection of the right to information remained within the low risk range (32%), although 
it was higher than in MPM2016 (24%). In this sub-indicator the majority of countries scored a low risk (21), with 7 coun-
tries at medium risk (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Hungary, Spain, Malta, Slovenia) and 3 countries at high risk (Austria, 
Luxembourg and Turkey). Austria and Luxembourg confirmed the negative scores in regard to the respect of access to 
information standards, resulting both from MPM2015 and MPM2016 assessments. In Austria, Article 20(4) of the Fed-
eral Constitution states that there is a right to information. However, the obligation of administrative authorities (at a 
national, regional and local level) to maintain secrecy has precedence (Article 20(3)). There is no positive obligation for 
the authorities to provide information to the public. In Luxembourg, the Ministry of State has elaborated a new draft bill 
on “open and transparent administration”, which has been widely criticised by civil society organisations as being too 
restrictive (and, Schall, 2018). In Turkey, the right to freedom of information faces too many exemptions, interpreted 
broadly, thus severely limiting the effective scope of the right. 
As for the sub-indicator on the Protection of whistle-blowers, the situation is alarming. The average risk for this sub-in-
dicator is 51% (medium risk), with 24 countries scoring a medium risk (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, FYRoM, Italy, Lithuania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Poland) or high risk (Estonia, 
Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Turkey and the United Kingdom), and only 7 countries are at 
low risk (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden). This is due to the fact that there is 
either no comprehensive regulatory framework for the protection of whistle-blowers (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey) or when it does exist 
it is not generally enforced in practice (Austria, France, FYRoM, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Ro-
mania, Serbia, Slovakia, the United Kingdom). Other cases are those of a law, as in the case of Malta, that does not fit the 
purpose (the weakness of regulation to protect whistle-blowers: the law does not protect whistle-blowers if they fail at 
first resort to take on internal reporting procedures, or if they report to the press or other media) or, as in the case of Italy, 
they can hardly be assessed in terms of practical application, due to its recent adoption. In Luxembourg, the regulatory 
measures in place are assessed as being too restrictive, because they are mainly limited to cases of corruption, trading in 
influence, or to money laundering. 
It must also be noted that retrieving datasets and research, both on the implementation of the law on whistle-blowers and 
on the effective conditions of whistle-blowers (i.e., whether, for instance, whistle-blowers are facing negative consequenc-
es in relation to their actions) proved to be difficult.
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JOURNALISTIC PROFESSION, STANDARDS AND PROTECTION
Journalists (and other media actors) are those who, in a functioning democratic society, feed the public debate and ensure 
that the public is informed on all matters of public interest. In contributing to the public debate, journalists influence public 
opinion and, in the end, the electoral choices of voters and the accountability of politicians. It is therefore important that, in a 
democratic society, access to the journalistic profession is not limited (i.e., subject to licensing schemes)24; and that journalists 
can act independently to political and commercial interests and that may rely on an “enabling environment” to carry out 
their job. In this regard, the standards are provided by the ECtHR: the Court has stressed, in its case-law, in which countries 
have positive obligations to “create a favourable environment for participation in public debate by all persons concerned, en-
abling them to express their opinions and ideas without fear”25. This means also that the countries have a duty to guarantee 
a safe environment in which journalists and other media actors can exercise their watchdog function26.
The MPM indicator on the Journalistic profession, standards and protection deals with a range of different aspects concerning 
the journalists and journalism. The indicator is composed of four sub-indicators which describe risks that result from condi-
tions to access the profession; from the level of the representation of the interests of media professionals and media employers 
in labour relations, and the effectiveness of professional organisations in guaranteeing professional standards; from safety 
conditions, both physical and “digital”, and working conditions; and from the existence and levels of the implementation of 
rules on the protection of journalistic sources. MPM2017 has also introduced two new variables in order to acknowledge the 
situation in those countries in which cases of the arbitrary arrests or the imprisonment of journalists because of the exercising 
of their profession, are envisaged (whether there are, for instance, politically motivated arrests/detainment and imprison-
ment of journalists) and the cases of severe threats to the lives of journalists, including physical threats, injuries and killings.
Figure 1.1.7. Indicator on Journalistic profession, standards and protection - Map of risks per country
This indicator scores a low risk 26%. This risk is lower than in MPM2016, but must be read in the light of the different 
composition of the sub-indicator on the protection of journalists. The inclusion of two new variables on arbitrary arrests 
or imprisonments, and the killings of journalists, formally reduced the risks for this indicator in the majority of the coun-
24  Cf. Art. 19, Licensing of media workers, https://www.article19.org/pages/en/licensing-of-media-workers.html.
25  ECtHR, case Dink v. Turkey, 2668/07, 6102/08, 30079/08, 7072/09 et 7124/09. See also, the Committee of Ministers adopted a Recom-
mendation on the protection of journalism and the safety of journalists and other media actors (2016) 4.
26  This obligation was also stressed during the 2016 Colloquium on Fundamental Rights, see the Media pluralism and democra-
cy: outcomes of the 2016 Annual Colloquium on Fundamental Rights, http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/docu-
ment/2016-50/2016-fundamental-colloquium-conclusions_40602.pdf
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tries assessed by the MPM, with the only exceptions of Malta and Turkey. It is suggested, therefore, that the results of 
this indicator be read taking into account the composition of the indicator itself and the scoring per sub-indicator, which 
analyse different risks that are related to the status of journalists, to better compare the results with MPM2016.
Figure 1.1.8. Indicator on Journalistic profession, standards and protection - Averages per sub-indicator
Access to the journalistic profession does not show particular limitations in the EU (average of the indicator 12%). As a 
standard in Europe, in most countries the access to the profession is open: self-regulatory instruments prescribe who may 
practice journalism; commonly there is licensing or registration of journalists, and this is made on the basis of transpar-
ent, objective, proportionate and non-discriminatory requirements. As in MPM2016, Italy scores a high risk under this 
sub-indicator, as access to the journalistic profession is conditional upon the rules defined by a specific law (n.69 of 1963) 
that requires mandatory enrolment in the Albo dei Giornalisti (Register of Journalists), which is kept by the Ordine dei 
Giornalisti (Order of Journalists), in order to be qualified as a professional journalist. As in MPM2016, in some countries, 
access to journalism seems to be restrained de facto by poor working conditions that are associated with the profession 
itself (Austria, Hungary), and by political pressures (Hungary). Although there are no legal barriers, the country report 
also stresses that access to the profession in Ireland is influenced by education (and the level of education, by income).
The assessment of the effectiveness of professional associations and unions in supporting better working conditions, 
including independence for member journalists27, shows an average medium and stable risk (47% against the 46% of 
MPM2016). This somehow confirms a general trend, as most of the countries analysed score a high or medium risk un-
der the relevant variables (see also CMPF, 2017).
The indicator on the Journalistic profession, standards and protection contains a variable to assess the risks for the 
protection of journalists, both in terms of professional standards and safety, including those in the digital media. The 
assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, in October, 2017, in Malta, was a crime that heavily influenced public opinion 
on the role, and on the threats to investigative journalists. Her murder shook the international community and abruptly 
brought into focus and raised awareness in Europe on the issue of the safety of journalists. Daphne Caruana Galizia was 
a very well known Maltese journalist. She published in many local newspapers and also personally edited the Running 
Commentary, a very popular blog in which she was reporting on cases of misconduct, corruption andmoney-launder-
ing, mostly involving Maltese politicians. CMPF, in MPM2016, acknowledged her problematic situation and the threats 
27  Please, note that the assessment for this variable is subject to the so called “Group of experts’ procedure”, see below, Part 2 of this report. 
This means that the MPM country team evaluation was  checked against the opinion of seven experts, who represented stakeholders in the media 
sector, NGOs and academics.
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she was suffering28. As regards the MPM2017, the risk relating to the sub-indicator on the protection of journalists has 
sensibly risen for Malta. The murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia has been a sad reminder of the fact that Europe is not 
immune from such horrible crimes being committed against journalists. This event should remind EU governments that 
they have the positive obligation to guarantee an enabling environment for journalists (ECtHR Dink vs Turkey) and they 
have to put in place all the efforts to avoid impunity for such crimes. The killing of Daphne Caruana Galizia was followed, 
in early 2018, by the murder of the investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová, in Slovakia. 
Kuciak was investigating the links of local politicians with Italian organised crime. It must be noted that, as it covers just 
the events which occurred in 2017, the MPM2017 is not assessing the impact of these last murders on the indicator on 
the Status of journalists. The results for Slovakia, therefore, cannot be used as an evaluation of the situation in the light 
of 2018’s events. CMPF, nonetheless, uses the opportunity of this report, written in 2018, to stress the need to keep the 
alarm level high when it comes to the protection of journalists, something that is not clearly focussed upon by all Eu-
ropean governments. For instance, recently, the new Italian minister for Internal Affairs has declared he is planning to 
reconsider the need for the state armed escort for the journalist Roberto Saviano, internationally known for his inquiries 
into Italian criminal organisations29, who has beenseriously threatened by them as a consequence. Statements like this, 
grounded on the assumption that having an armed escort is a privilege, may be detrimental to the establishment of an 
enabling environment for journalists.
It must be noted that, in MPM2017, 13 countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Malta, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Sweden) are assessed as having a medium risk in relation to  the sub-indicator on the 
protection of journalists, meaning that there are either poor working conditions or threats. When analysing the details of 
the sub-indicator, 12 countries have reported cases of threats to journalists in their countries (Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, 
FYRoM, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, the United Kingdom) and 12 have re-
ported cases of both threats and attacks (Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Romania, Serbia, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey). In the case of Croatia, for instance, there have been multiple threats to, and attacks on, journalists in 
recent years. Among the most prominent, an effigy of a columnist Ante Tomić was burned publicly during a carnival in 
2014, and he was also attacked twice in his hometown,  Split. An investigative journalist Željko Peratović, was brutally 
attacked in 2014. The European Journalists’ Association noted the case, and sent an open letter to all of the relevant pub-
lic officials. They supported the Croatian Journalists’ Association (HND) in requesting that public authorities classify 
the case as an attempted murder30. In Greece, attacks on journalists are becoming frequent, for instance, the attacks by 
Golden Dawn members: in April, 2017. ESIEA, the journalists’ association based in Athens, reported on a group of about 
ten masked individuals who burst into the office of Kathimerini in Thessaloniki, throwing paint and flyers. In Italy, there 
were many cases of journalists being beaten and threatened, mostly by organised crime. In 2017, in order to guarantee 
their safety, the Italian government granted an armed escort to 20 journalists. In Romania, according to MPM2017 data 
collection, there have been many cases of journalists being threatened by politicians. Cases of impunity for crimes against 
journalists (the murder of Dada Vujasinovic in Serbia, and of Hrant Dink in Turkey) have been reported.
Turkey also scores as a high risk in the sub-indicator on the Protection of journalists as a consequence of the impris-
onment of many journalists. After the attempted coup of July, 2016, the risk gravely increased in the country. In the 
aftermath of the coup-attempt, the government has used excessive powers, gained under the state of emergency, to purge 
media outlets and to silence dissident journalists. According to the Platform for Independent Journalism, P24, at least 
153 media workers are in jail, about 200 media outlets (including community and minority media outlets) were closed as 
at March 15, 2018 (Inceoglu et al 2018).
As regards digital safety of journalists, the indicator on the Journalistic profession, standards and protection in the MPM 
collects information on the existence of threats to the digital safety of journalists, including through the illegitimate sur-
veillance of their searches and online activities, their email or social media profiles, hacking and other attacks by state or 
non-state actors. Threats of violence, typically made online, have become increasingly common in recent years. As public 
figures, journalists are often targeted. The data show that online threats are faced by journalists in 17 countries. Journal-
ists are often subjected to hate speech, and are also implicitly or explicitly threatened with violence. The analysis of the 
cases shows that, sometimes, individual journalists are singled out online, and in some cases they are repeatedly attacked 
over an extended period, both on the social media and/or by private email or messages. 
28  Her bank accounts were being frozen with precautionary warrants for €47,460 after a court upheld (8 February, 2017) a request from 
the Maltese Economy Minister, Chris Cardona, and his consultant, Joe Gerada, to issue garnishee orders alongside the four libel suits they had 
filed against her (CoE, 10 Feb. 2017).
29  https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2018/06/21/news/da_salvini_avvertimento_a_saviano_valutiamo_se_gli_serve_la_scor-
ta_-199583859/
30  MPM2017 data collection
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In France, the law allows a wide range of public officials (including the police, the gendarmerie, intelligence and anti-ter-
rorist agencies, as well as several government ministries) to directly monitor computer, tablet and smartphone use in real 
time, and without prior authorisation, for the purpose of gathering metadata (Willsher, 2013). This legislation contains 
no exemptions that might apply to journalistic communications31.
A final note on the protection of sources: the Netherlands seems to be the only country where protection of sources is 
not established in any law, or in case-law, and this represents a risk in this country. The Dutch government has been 
repeatedly criticised by the European Court of Human Rights for not having legislation in place that legally guarantees 
the protection of journalistic sources. In Greece, there is no general recognition of this professional secrecy for jour-
nalists, but a 2003 Presidential Decree states that journalists have the right not to disclose their sources of information, 
information which they have secured in confidence. This is a limited legal recognition of the protection of sources, as it 
only applies to radio and television news and current affairs programmes. Moreover, there is no legal elaboration of any 
permissible restrictions to it. According to MPM2017 data, only a few countries report poor implementation of the rules 
on the protection of sources (FYRoM, Hungary, UK).
31  MPM2017 data collection for France
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INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MEDIA AUTHORITY
The indicator on the independence and effectiveness of the media authority is designed to capture a number of the different 
characteristics of the media authorities in the countries analysed: whether the appointment procedures guarantee their in-
dependence and whether the authorities are independent in practice; whether the allocation of budgetary resources protects 
authorities from coercive budgetary pressures and ensures the possibility to perform their functions freely; the type of powers 
and appeal mechanisms which are in place with regard to the authorities’ decisions; and the transparency and accountability 
of their actions. On a methodological note, the MPM considers a media authority to be a public body which upholds the 
rules that are formulated in media acts and laws and which oversees the media market. For those countries that do not have 
an authority specifically devoted to media regulation, the MPM asks to consider and assess the authority that is part of the 
European Regulators’ Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) or of the European Platform of Regulatory Authorities 
(EPRA). For Estonia, for instance, the Technical Regulation Authority is considered, while, for Spain, the MPM considers the 
competition authority.
Figure 1.1.9. Indicator on Independence and effectiveness of the media authority - Map of risks per country
Media authorities are increasingly becoming key actors in media regulation in Europe. The recent agreement of the Tri-
logue32 on the revision of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) stresses their importance (within the scope 
of the AVMSD, the authorities for audiovisual media services) and aims to reinforce their independence from political 
and commercial interests. In particular, the draft reform includes a requirement for Member States to have independent 
regulatory authorities for audiovisual media services that should be legally distinct from the executive power, and also 
functionally independent of their respective governments and of any other public or private body. The independent au-
diovisal media authorities should not be instructed by any other body in relation to the exercise of their tasks and they 
should exercise their powers impartially and transparently, in line with the objectives of the AVMSD, including in rela-
tion to media pluralism, cultural and linguistic diversity, consumer protection, accessibility, non-discrimination,
32  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-4093_en.htm
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 the internal market and the promotion of fair competition. The competencies of audiovisual media authorities should 
be clearly defined in law and should have adequate resources and enforcement powers in order to carry out their func-
tions effectively. Member States have to set up transparent procedures for the appointment and dismissal of the head of 
a national regulatory authority or the members of the collegiate body. An appeal mechanism against the decision of a 
regulator at the national level will also be provided.33.
The standards that have been highlighted by the draft directive are those that the MPM already uses to assess the inde-
pendence and effectiveness of the media authorities. It must be acknowledged that the MPM methodology considers 
a media authority to be a public body which upholds the rules that are formulated in media acts and laws and which 
oversees the (audiovisual) media market. For those countries that do not have an authority devoted to media regulation, 
the MPM asks to consider and assess the authority that is part of the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media 
Services (ERGA), or of the European Platform for Regulatory Authorities (EPRA). In Estonia, for instance, the Technical 
Regulation Authority is considered, while for Spain it is the competition authority that is considered.
In MPM2017, the average score for the indicator on Independence and effectiveness of the media authority is 21%, 
meaning that it is a low risk. There are no major changes in the assessment of this indicator if compared to MPM2016. 
Just 7 countries reach a medium risk (FYRoM, Greece, Hungary, Malta, Serbia, Slovenia, and Spain). This is due to the 
fact that, despite most of these countries having laws in place to ensure more transparency and independence for the 
media authorities, the appointment procedures are not always effective in safeguarding the political and/or commercial 
independence of the members. The data collection for these countries reports also that, in practice, media authorities 
are subject to some kind of political interference in their activities. Turkey is the only country that scores a high risk in 
this indicator, confirming the assessment in MPM2016. In addition to the evaluation of MPM2016, stressing the politi-
cal capture of the body, it must be added that, in the aftermath of the coup attempt, the government issued decree-laws 
ordering the closure of TV channels and radio stations, predominantly for alleged links to the Gülen movement, thus by-
passing the role of the authority. The closures and suspensions extended to a number of channels that were broadcasting 
in the Kurdish language, one Alevi channel and some opposition channels34. 
Figure 1.1.10. Indicator on Independence and effectiveness of the media authority - Averages per sub-indicator 
33  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-4093_en.htm
34  MPM2017 data collection for Turkey. (see country report)
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In general, the main risks seen in the indicator stem from the sub-indicator on appointing procedures and from the indi-
cator assessing the effective independence of the media authority. As in MPM2016, this is due to the weak effectiveness 
of mechanisms that exclude political or commercial influences and ensure the independence of the authorities through 
appropriate appointment procedures for the members of the authorities. Political influence on appointments do not au-
tomatically mean that the authority will act in line with political input, but it clearly poses a risk of further interference. 
The sub-indicator on the independence of the media authority scores a low risk, with a percentage (29%) close to the 
medium risk level, highlighting some cases where the authority has been captured by external pressure. Bulgaria, Croa-
tia, Cyprus, FYRoM, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Spain score as a medium risk for this 
sub-indicator. Hungary, Serbia and Turkey score as a high risk. In Hungary, as reported by the MPM country team, since 
its establishment under the new media laws that came into effect in 2010, the Media Council has not shown professional 
independence from political or commercial influences in a great number of regulatory decisions. In particular, the Coun-
cil’s tendering and licensing decisions have been heavily criticized by both domestic and international rights groups for 
being lacking in transparency, and on many occasions, for decisions that appear to favour outlets with close ties to the 
government. In Serbia, the media authority has not been politically independent since its initial establishment, based on 
the Broadcasting law from 2002: the Council of the Regulatory Body for Electronic Media, REM, operates with only six 
of nine members and, according to the MPM2017 data collection, lacks independence in monitoring broadcasters so 
as to ensure that they meet their programming obligations. A number of OSCE/ODIHR EAM interlocutors expressed 
concerns with regard to REM membership, the underlying reluctance of the ruling coalition to support civil society nom-
inations during election campaigns, leading to a general lack in the regulator’s independence.
Across the 31 countries under consideration, the assessment of the competencies of the authorities scores an overall 
(low) 7% risk level. Within this sub-indicator the main problem comes from a few cases in which the government has 
overruled the decisions of the media authority. 
Media authorities have an important role in the governance of the national media sectors and media pluralism. MPM2016 
had already highlighted some trends relatingnot only to the level of independence of the media authorities, but also to 
their “resilience” vis à vis political power. Media authorities can be exposed, for instance, to political turnover and to the 
changes stemming from media regulation reforms in a given country. That was the case of Poland as regards MPM2016, 
where the KRRiT was deprived of competencies by a very controversial legislative reform. In some cases, the government 
may overrule the decisions of independent authorities. It must be noted that a recent decision of the European Union 
Court of Justice (2017) in the case C-560/15 Europa Way srl-AGCOM, has stated that, according to the EU framework on 
electronic communications, the procedure for the allocation of frequencies in the so-called beauty contest for the DTTV 
in Italy should not have been overruled by the government and the parliament. This interference constitutes an infringe-
ment of the NRA’s independence and the sentence, probably, sets clearer EU standards on media and communication 
authorities, at least for the convergent ones.
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UNIVERSAL REACH OF TRADITIONAL MEDIA AND ACCESS TO THE INTERNET
The aim of the indicator on the universal reach of traditional media and access to the Internet is to describe the risks to plu-
ralism that arise from an insufficient level of access to platforms of content distribution. It assesses the risk stemming from 
traditional tv and radio network coverage, broadband coverage and access to the internet. The indicator consists also of 
variables on net neutrality.
Figure 1.1.11. Indicator on Universal reach of traditional media and access to the Internet - Map of risks per country
The majority of the countries analysed by MPM2017 scored a medium risk for the indicator Universal reach of tradition-
al media and access to the Internet (19 of 31), with 9 countries attaining a low risk (Belgium, Denmark, Latvia, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Serbia, Slovenia, Sweden, the United Kingdom) and only 3 countries (FYRoM, Portugal, Turkey) showing 
as high risk.
In Europe, most of the population is covered, and served, by the networks and programmes of PSM. Considering the 
high threshold for assessing the risk levels (Low: 99% or more; Medium: >98% and <99%; High: <98%), the coverage of 
PSM in Europe is quite satisfactory: 8 countries score a medium risk (22 countries score a low risk). Luxembourg scores 
as a high risk, due to the lack of a regulation asking for the full coverage of the local public radio and the effective allegedly 
low coverage (90%) of the (small) territory of the country.
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Figure 1.1.12. Indicator on Universal reach of traditional media and access to the Internet - Averages per sub-indicator
As for Internet Access, 7 countries scored as a medium risk, 14 as a high one, with just 9 countries attaining a low risk 
level (Serbia is not assessed due to a lack of data). MPM2017, again, has a very high threshold for assessing this risk, 
which is calculated by taking into account the existing levels of access to the internet in EU countries35.
This indicator also showed high concentration of the market shares in the hands of the TOP 4 Internet Service provid-
ers (ISPs) in the large majority of the countries analysed. In 6 countries, no data were found. Harmonised rules on net 
neutrality have applied throughout the EU as of 30 April, 2016, following the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 
on 25 November, 2015 (which is directly binding). So the principle of net neutrality has been introduced directly in all 
28 EU member states. Ireland and Portugal, nonetheless, score as a high risk for this sub-indicator, with Turkey, as they 
still report a partial non-compliance with the effective situation in relation to both EU Regulation and Berec guidelines.
35  MPM2017 uses speed data from the content distribution management company Akamai, which has servers around the world and is re-
ported to handle a large percentage of global Internet traffic. Of the European countries considered by the MPM, no country currently has speed 
under 7.1 Mbps or over 22.8 Mbs.
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1.2 ANALYSIS OF MARKET PLURALITY AREA
 
The Market Plurality area aims to assess the risks to media pluralism that arise from the legal and economic context in which 
market players, most notably content providers, operate. For example, it seeks to establish whether regulation that restricts 
the concentration of ownership has been enacted and, if so, whether it is effectively implemented. This area further attempts 
to unfold the economic conditions of the market in which these providers offer their services. For instance, it attempts to de-
pict the levels of ownership concentration with reference to the market and the audience shares that media firms hold, and to 
interpret, in terms of editorial autonomy from commercial influences, the effective functioning of media markets.
The Market Plurality area is comprised of the following five indicators:
●   Transparency of media ownership 
●   Horizontal concentration of ownership
●   Cross-media concentration of ownership and competition enforcement
●   Commercial & owner influence over editorial content
●   Media viability
As with all other areas of the Monitor, the above five indicators consist of sub-indicators. In turn, these sub-indicators encom-
pass variables that evaluate the risks that are pertinent to the issue under examination. For example, the indicator assessing 
commercial & owner influence over editorial content contains a sub-indicator on editorial decision-making, which includes 
variables relating to regulation that prohibits advertorials. 
If compared to MPM2016, the most significant changes in the Market Plurality area are related to the indicators on the 
transparency of media ownership and on media viability, as will be explained in the respective topics. 
Figure 1.2.1. Market Plurality area - Map of risks per country
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The results for the Market Plurality area show only two countries with a low risk level (France and Germany), 23 coun-
tries with a medium risk level (Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, FYRoM, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and 
the United Kingdom) and 6 countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Poland and Romania) that score a 
high risk. In total, there is an average risk of 53% for the area, resulting in an increase of 4% in comparison to MPM2016, 
and this is partially related to the changes introduced in the indicator on the Transparency of media ownership, which 
now give a heavier weight to the direct disclosure to the public of ownership information (see below), as opposed to a 
similar weight given to ownership information disclosure, both to the public and to public authorities. As happened in 
MPM2016, France scored the lowest risk level in this area.
Figure 1.2.2. Market Plurality area - Averages per indicator
None of the indicators in the Market Plurality area scores as a low risk on average across the 31 countries. All score as 
being at medium risk. The risk level for the indicator on media ownership concentration is estimated at 66%, on average, 
very close to the threshold of high risk. The only countries that score as a low risk for this area are Germany and France, 
i.e., two big countries with a high GDP, a large population and territory. Moreover, this is the only area in which some 
indicators score a higher risk for the EU28 in comparison to the EU28 + 3, as in the case of the indicators on cross-media 
concentration of ownership and competition enforcement (EU28 score 54% and EU28 + 3 score 52%) and on media 
ownership concentration (EU28 69% and EU28 + 3 66%).
In comparison to MPM2016 data, two indicators (of five) demonstrated a considerable increase in their risk level (trans-
parency of media ownership and media viability), a result that is partially due to methodological refinements that have 
been made in the MPM 2017 variable for these indicators.
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TRANSPARENCY OF MEDIA OWNERSHIP
The first indicator in the market plurality area is on media ownership transparency. This indicator aims to assess the exis-
tence and effectiveness of the implementation of the transparency and disclosure provisions that relate to media ownership 
and/or control. Ownership transparency should be interpreted as a sort of essential pre-condition for any reliable analysis of 
the plurality of a given media market.
Differently to MPM2016, MPM2017 focuses on the disclosure of ownership information directly to the public, giving less 
weight to the information that is disclosed only to public authorities. With this change, this indicator has demonstrated 
a considerable increase in the average risk level, moving from 34% in 2016 to 46% in 2017, although this is still within 
the medium risk range.
Figure 1.2.3. Indicator on Transparency of media ownership - Map of risks per country
In MPM2017, only 11 countries scored a low risk level for the indicator on the transparency of ownership (Austria, Bel-
gium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, FYRoM, Germany, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain), 7 less than the 18 countries 
that scored as low risk in 2016. In fact, of these 11 countries 3 score in the very highest range of the low risk band (33% 
- Bulgaria, FYRoM and Lithuania). 
Moreover, 7 countries scored a high risk for this indicator (Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, the Netherlands, Greece, Fin-
land and the Czech Republic), with just 1 of these countries having media-specific provisions in their national laws that 
require the disclosure of ownership details directly to the public (Hungary), but still with no legal requirements to dis-
close to the public information about the ultimate owners of media outlets. High risk can also be due to poor information 
being offered to the public (Slovenia), or to incomplete information being provided by the media authority (the Nether-
lands). On top of this, the real owners of the media often remain undisclosed due to various legal loopholes (Romania). 
In Greece, the absence of agreements with foreign authorities, the media authority’s limited ability to cross-check own-
ership information with the information held by other domestic bodies, and the restraint on its capacity to scrutinise the 
information available due to insufficient resources, undermine the transparency of media ownership (Psychogiopoulou 
and Kandyla, 2018), and in Bulgaria the identification of ultimate owners is still an issue of concern, despite the existence 
of three media ownership registers and a general Commercial register, as in some cases it is impossible to identify the 
ultimate owners, because the identification process leads to offshore companies.
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Figure 1.2.4. Indicator on Transparency of media ownership - Averages per sub-indicator
The average score for this indicator is better for EU28 + 3 than just for EU28, with one sub-indicator scoring the same 
percentage for the 2 groups of countries (the effectiveness of ownership transparency - 45%) and one sub-indicator scor-
ing better for EU 28 + 3 than only for the EU28 (46% and 47% respectively).
Nevertheless, the two sub-indicators of the Transparency of media ownership indicator are in the same risk range (me-
dium), with almost the same percentage of risk, although the indicator on ownership transparency policy showed an 
increase in comparison to 2016 (34%), mostly due to changes introduced to this indicator for the MPM2017. This result 
should not be a surprise, as the risks examined are strictly connected: the sub-indicator on the effectiveness of ownership 
transparency asks for the availability, in practice, of publicly accessible information that allows identification of the bene-
ficial and ultimate owners of media outlets, while the other sub-indicator is concerned with the legal framework so as to 
insure that such information is made available, both to the public and to public authorities. 
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HORIZONTAL CONCENTRATION OF MEDIA OWNERSHIP
The second indicator of the Market Plurality area is the one on the Concentration of media ownership. This indicator is 
composed of several sub-indicators that aim to assess the threats to media pluralism that arise from the structure of the 
media market. This indicator presents a traditional measure of market concentration that aims at the relationship between 
external pluralism and the concrete plurality and market dimension of different media outlets in each market segment. The 
risk level of this indicator is evaluated by taking into account the existence and effectiveness of the implementation of regu-
latory safeguards against a high horizontal concentration of ownership in different media markets. It does this by measuring 
the effective concentration of the market using a Top4 index.36 Furthermore, the assessment is carried out by considering 
the existence and effectiveness of ad hoc regulatory safeguards against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or 
control in a specific media sector, and the existence of competition rules that take into account the specificities of the media 
sector when analysing mergers in a particular market. The assessment of the legal framework is linked, then, to the effective 
measuring of the concentration of the given market, and this allows a better evaluation of the risk, considering both the legal 
standards and the effective conditions of the media market. The analysis is carried out by separately considering the main 
different media markets (audiovisual, radio, newspapers, and online content providers37).
As regards audiovisual media, the Monitor adopts the definition that is laid down in the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive 2010/13/EU.38 The variables under consideration cover both linear and non-linear audiovisual media services. 
This approach is intended to reflect the technological developments that have been dramatically altering traditional 
broadcasting markets (and the regulatory environment). 
This indicator has suffered no change in the last year, with no significant changes in the results if compared to MPM2016. 
As can be seen from the map below, no country scores as low risk, which is the same result that was achieved in MPM2016, 
confirming an important level of horizontal market concentration in all of the countries examined by the MPM. The 
2017 result is that 14 countries score as a medium risk (Croatia, Cyprus, France, FYRoM, Germany, Greece, Italy, Malta, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom) and 17 as high risk (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania and Sweden).
36  Concentration is measured by using the Top4 (or C4 or four-firm) concentration ratio. The four-firm concentration ratio is an indica-
tor of the size of the four largest firms within an industry, compared to the output of the entire industry. 
37  The indicator on media ownership concentration (horizontal), however, does not yet consider online content providers.
38  Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32010L0013&from=EN 
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Figure 1.2.5. Indicator on Media ownership concentration (horizontal) - Map of risks per country
The histogram (Figure 1.2.6.) shows that 2 sub-indicators scored a medium average risk (AVMS and Radio), with 1 scor-
ing a high risk (the Newspaper sector), which is probably related to the specific financial difficulties that printed media 
outlets are facing – and which is also reflected in the indicator on media viability -, with the newspaper sector being the 
one with the biggest problems in terms of revenues in recent years.
Figure 1.2.6. Indicator on Media ownership concentration (horizontal) - Averages per sub-indicator
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The result of this indicator in MPM2017 confirms that market concentration is a source of medium or high risk for me-
dia pluralism in all of the EU countries, without exception. The economic difficulties of several of the traditional media, 
illustrated by other indicators, suggests that horizontal media concentration is unlikely to recede in the future, as many 
types of media will continue to merge in order to survive, and this will remain one of the most common elements of risk 
for the MPM project to monitor and investigate in EU countries in the future.   
As regards the audiovisual sector, the only country scoring as a low risk is Turkey, while most of the countries score a 
medium risk (22, comprising Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, FYRoM, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and the United 
Kingdom), and the remaining 8 countries scored in the high risk zone (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden).
Similarly, in the radio sector, only 3 countries scored as a low risk (Croatia, FYRoM and Turkey), while 19 countries 
scored as a medium risk (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom) and the remaining 
9 countries scored as a high risk (Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Swe-
den).
Finally, as far as the newspaper sector is concerned, only Greece scores as a low risk for this sub-indicator (mostly due to 
a regulatory anti-concentration framework being in place, and to a low Top4 ratio for newspaper readership) with Ger-
many (again with a relatively low Top4 ratio for readership at 38%), Serbia, Croatia, Italy, the United Kingdom, Slovenia, 
FYRoM, Spain scoring as a medium risk and all remaining countries scoring as a high risk. In this indicator, all of the 
sub-indicators score better for EU28+3 than for EU28 only.
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CROSS-MEDIA CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP AND COMPETITION EN-
FORCEMENT
This indicator consists of two sub-indicators. The first seeks to assess the risks to media pluralism that arise from cross-media 
concentration of ownership. Cross-media concentration reflects the level of control that may be exercised by one, or a few, me-
dia owners in a number of sectors within the industry (e.g., the position held by a media conglomerate in the audiovisual and 
newspaper publishing markets). The second sub-indicators seek to assess whether, and, if so, how, competition enforcement, 
that is, antitrust and merger control and safeguards to ensure the proportionality of Public Service Media (PSM) funding, 
contribute to the enhancement of media pluralism. 
The trend to media concentration, in relation to the financial crisis of traditional media, is an element of additional risk 
for media pluralism in the EU. Mergers among media companies are not only a horizontal phenomenon, but interest all 
of the media markets, creating a trend toward conglomerate formations of media, in an attempt to exploit economies of 
scale and of scope. The specific attention, or the lack thereof, of competition authorities, who are called to evaluate con-
glomerate mergers, to the pluralistic dimensions is part of the MPM’s investigation:
As in MPM2016, in MPM2017 this indicator scores as a medium risk (52%, a percentage that is comparable to the 54% of 
2016), with only 8 countries (Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Greece, Slovakia, Cyprus, Italy and Serbia) scoring 
as a low risk, 15 countries show as a medium risk (Hungary, Turkey, Croatia, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, 
FYRoM, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Slovenia, Belgium, the Czech Republic and Finland) and 8 countries as a high risk 
(Romania, Malta, Spain, Denmark, Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland and Luxembourg).
Figure 1.2.7. Indicator on Cross-media concentration of ownership and competition enforcement - Map of risks per country
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Figure 1.2.8. Indicator on Cross-media concentration of ownership and competition enforcement - Averages per sub-indicator
The sub-indicator that scores the higher risk within this indicator is that  on the cross-media concentration of owner-
ship - with EU28 scoring a higher risk than EU28 + 3 (71% and 67%, respectively), partly due to the absence of data, 
as is the case with FYRoM and Malta, or to the lack of specific thresholds or other limitations in media legislation that 
prevent a high degree of cross-media concentration of ownership, as is the case with Denmark. Most countries have no 
specific provisions in the media legislation that can prevent a high degree of cross-media concentration of ownership 
(16 countries). This is the case with Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden. Greece, Malta, Serbia, Slova-
kia, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Hungary, Slovenia, Austria, Turkey, Italy, Croatia have a medium risk, while 
Bulgaria, Poland, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, the 
Czech Republic, Belgium, Estonia, Finland and Spain score a high risk.
The medium risk for the sub-indicator on Competition enforcement results from the fact that most of the competition 
laws in the assessed States do not take into account the specificities of the media sector (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, FYRoM, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Roma-
nia, Slovenia and Sweden). In fact, among the countries that have no specific provisions in the media law to prevent the 
cross-media concentration of ownership, and only 4 have competition laws that take into account the specificities of the 
media sector (Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain). This regulatory reality may be particularly damaging to me-
dia pluralism because competition enforcement alone is usually insufficient to remedy concerns arising from acquisition 
by a media firm of significant opinion-forming power. Moreover, most of the assessed countries have mechanisms and 
safeguards to ensure the proportionality of PSM funding, so that State funds granted to PSM do not exceed what is nec-
essary in order to provide the public service, with no disproportionate effects on competition. Although this information 
relates to a different variable, it shows that at least as far as competition between private media outlets and public service 
media is concerned, there are rules that prevent the State from adversely impacting on competition through the granting 
of disproportionate funds to the public service media.
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COMMERCIAL AND OWNER INFLUENCE OVER EDITORIAL CONTENT
This indicator seeks to assess the risks to media pluralism that arise from the qualitative dimension of ownership concen-
tration, that is, commercial influence over editorial content. To this end, variables evaluate a given media landscape in the 
light of a number of practices that may undermine editorial freedom. More particularly, the indicator includes variables 
that assess, inter alia, the mechanisms granting social protection to journalists in cases where ownership and/or the editorial 
line change, laws prohibiting advertorials, regulations stipulating the obligation of journalists and/or media outlets to not 
be influenced by commercial interests and, more generally, whether the media in the landscape concerned are governed by 
practices through which commercial interests dictate editorial decisions.
On average, the risk level for this indicator is at the medium risk level (55%)
In 2017, the structure of this indicator has remained unchanged, with the same variables as in MPM2016. The risk level 
also stayed stable, with almost the same percentage as that shown in MPM2016 (55%), which is within the medium risk 
level. 
Only 5 countries scored as low risk (the Netherlands, France, Portugal, Cyprus, Denmark), 12 countries scored as a me-
dium risk (Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Estonia, Slovakia, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Croatia, Greece, Ireland and Serbia), 
with 5 of them in the highest range of the medium risk band (Belgium, Croatia, Greece, Ireland and Serbia), and 14 
countries scored as a high risk (Finland, Hungary, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, FYRoM, Turkey, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Malta, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria).
Figure 1.2.9. Indicator on Commercial and owner influence over editorial content - Map of risks per country
The sub-indicator that scores the highest risk within this indicator is the one on the Appointments and Dismissals (of 
journalists in general, and of editors-in-chief in particular): this is mostly related to the lack (or poor implementation) of 
legal mechanisms granting social protection to journalists in case of changes of ownership or editorial line, as well as to 
the absence of regulatory safeguards, including self-regulatory instruments, which seek to ensure that decisions regard-
ing the appointments and dismissals of editors-in-chief are not influenced by the commercial interests of the media own-
ers. With the problems that revenues have faced in recent years in the printed press sector, it is becoming common place 
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to use more advertising techniques in order to try to make the media outlets more sustainable. Even in bigger countries 
with a tradition of the printed press, as in the UK, the use of native advertisements is becoming commonplace, even in 
traditional newspapers, as highlighted by UK country team for the MPM 2017.39 In other countries, such as Bulgaria, the 
commercial influence is combined with external political pressure, as highlighted in the IREX Report 2017.40
As for the sub-indicator on Editorial Decision-Making, the risk resides more in the practical implementation of mea-
sures to ensure that editorial content is independent from commercial influence, as in most countries there are laws or 
self-regulatory regimes in place. This is the case, for instance, in Hungary and Bulgaria, the countries that scored the 
highest risk for this sub-indicator (83%). In Hungary, although there are self-regulatory regimes ensuring editorial in-
tegrity and independence, as well as provisions in media law specifying the independence of the media, in practice (as 
reported by the respective MPM country team), the editorial content of news media is heavily influenced by commercial 
and economic factors. The same happens in Bulgaria, which, despite having legal provisions that aim to protect editorial 
independence from political and economic pressures, media owners and other commercial entities systematically influ-
ence editorial content and often commercial and political influence are interrelated, as highlighted in the IREX report 
Media Sustainability Index for: Bulgaria (2017), which acknowledges that there is “visible political pressure on the leading 
national media”.41
Figure 1.2.10. Indicator on Commercial and owner influence over editorial content - Averages per sub-indicator
Clearly, the interaction of high concentration (horizontal or cross-media) with a strong commercial and owners’ influ-
ence over editorial content can represent a severe source of risk to media pluralism. The score of the last 3 indicators, 
and, in general, the unitary consideration of the area of Market Plurality, therefore requires a combined reading of the 
specific results so as to fully assess and recognise the risks to media pluralism that are a direct consequence of the elevated 
concentration of media markets that the MPM has found in Europe. 
39  In their analysis they quote Sharethrough, Native Ads vs Display Ads. Available at: https://www.sharethrough.com/resources/native-
ads-vs-display-ads/
40  https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/pdf/media-sustainability-index-europe-eurasia-2017-bulgaria.pdf 
41  Available at https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/pdf/media-sustainability-index-europe-eurasia-2017-bulgaria.pdf
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MEDIA VIABILITY
This indicator mainly assesses market revenue trends in four different sectors, namely, television, radio, newspaper publish-
ing and online advertising. The Monitor attempts to examine the parameters that determine media sustainability, with a 
focus on market developments.
The country teams were asked to evaluate the growth of, or decline in, the sector-specific revenues in relation to the GDP 
trends in the same period. 
This has led to a sizeable increase in the percentage of risk compared to 2016, going from 30% (low risk) to 42% (medium 
risk) in 2017. At present, the indicator still has the lowest average risk for the Market Plurality area, but its rapid growth is 
a signal of suffering in the traditional media industry. The risk level was also impacted by the fact that MPM2017 meth-
odology has been slightly modified and internet usage is not calculated anymore within this indicator (what was the case 
in MPM2016).
On average, 14 countries score as low risk for the indicator on media viability (Germany, France, Luxembourg, Lithua-
nia, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Portugal, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Ireland and Belgium), 11 
as medium risk (Finland, Croatia, Malta, Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovenia, Serbia, Slovakia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic and 
Poland) and 6 as high risk (FYRoM, Estonia, Turkey, Hungary, Romania and Greece), with Greece at the highest end 
of high risk with 90%, basically due to the methodological assessment of the absence of data regarding revenues in the 
different sectors, the lack of initiatives aiming to develop alternative sources of revenue for the media sector and the lack 
of support schemes for the media sector.
Figure 1.2.11. Indicator on Media viability - Map of risks per country
The two sub-indicators of the Media Viability indicator score similar risks levels. This is mostly explained by the fact that 
the countries which have problems with media revenues usually face similar problems with regard to the development 
of alternative sources of revenue and do not have support schemes for the media sector (or when they do have support 
schemes, they are not properly implemented). Estonia and Croatia are two examples that confirm this assessment. The 
former has experienced marked decreases in revenues in the traditional audiovisual and newspaper sectors in the last 
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two years and has no support schemes for the media sector. The latter, in its turn, has legal provisions establishing such 
schemes, but these schemes are not, in practice, operative.
It is important to highlight that - according to the MPM2017 data - the vast majority of the countries assessed have seen 
an increase in the expenditure for online advertising over the past two years (24 countries), with the exception of Hun-
gary and Spain, which are in a stationary situation, and a few other countries that have no data available in that respect 
(Serbia, Malta, FYRoM, Greece, Sweden). The audiovisual sector faces a similar scenario, with most of the countries 
showing an increase in revenues (16 countries), with only 4 presenting a decrease (Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovenia, FYRoM), 
4 are in a stationary situation (Denmark, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania), while 7 countries have no updated data in this regard 
(France, Greece, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Serbia).
The same scenario was found in the sub-indicator on Regulatory incentives, which assesses the existence of laws es-
tablishing favourable support schemes for the media sector and whether such State support schemes are properly im-
plemented. Among the countries that have laws establishing favourable support schemes for the media sector, only 9 
were assessed by the MPM country teams as having properly implemented these schemes (Denmark, France, Germany, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom), with 8 countries that do not even have 
a law establishing such schemes (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Turkey).
Figure 1.2.12. Indicator on Media viability - Averages per sub-indicator
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1.3 ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AREA
The area of Political Independence was designed to assess the risks of political interference in five different dimensions with 
respect to: media systems, media organisations, newsrooms, content production and, especially, to public service media. The 
five indicators focus on examining the existence and effectiveness of regulatory safeguards against political bias and political 
control over media outlets, news agencies and distribution networks. They are also concerned with the existence and effec-
tiveness of self-regulation in ensuring editorial independence. Moreover, they seek to evaluate the influence of state (and, 
more generally), of political power, over the functioning of the media market, and the independence of public service media.
The five indicators related to Political Independence are:
●  Political independence of media
●  Editorial autonomy
●  Media and democratic electoral process
●  State regulation of resources and support to media sector
●  Independence of PSM governance and funding
In the Political Independence area, a vast majority (18) of the countries examined scored as a medium risk, (see Figure 
1.3.1.), 9 are at low risk (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom), and 4 are found to be at high risk from political interference with the media: Turkey, and three EU 
member states - Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. This shows that 2017 brought no major changes in this area if compared 
to previous measurements. 
When comparing the 2017 results with those of 2016 (CMPF, 2017), the level of risk has increased for one country only: 
in Poland, where it went from medium to high risk. The increase in risk for Poland is related to higher risks being indi-
cated for the distribution of state subsidies to media outlets. Still, indicators on political independence, and especially on 
the independence of public service media, remain the chief concern for Poland within this area, but also within the entire 
Monitor (for a more detailed explanation of the Polish case see: Klimkiewicz, 2017 and 2018).
Figure 1.3.1. Political Independence area - Map of risks per country
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In Hungary and Slovenia, the absence of clear regulation and transparency in allocating state subsidies to the media 
remains a pressing issue. In addition, and many concerns for media pluralism in Hungary are related to a severe lack 
of editorial autonomy that is derived from systematic political interference in appointments and in the dismissals of 
editors-in-chief, and with regular attempts to influence editorial content. In Slovenia, as the country team reported, a 
conflict of interest between media ownership and holding government office is widely present, especially at local level.
Turkey is the only country that scores high risks for all five indicators within this area, and, in general, a lack of political 
independence is the subject causing the highest concern there. Following an attempted military coup on July 20, 2016, 
a three month state of emergency was declared in this EU candidate country. Since then, Turkey has been ruled under 
a state of emergency by decrees (Inceoglu et al., 2018). Furthermore, on April 16, 2017, a constitutional referendum 
was held and the amendments that expanded presidential powers by transforming the country from a parliamentary 
democracy into a presidential system were passed (Inceoglu et al., 2018). At the same time, journalists are imprisoned 
on charges of aiding a terrorist organisation through news content and columns, and six journalists and columnists were 
sentenced to life in prison on the grounds of their alleged roles in the failed coup attempt (Inceoglu et al., 2018). 
In 2017, the MPM was, for the first time, implemented in Serbia and FYRoM. Overall, both countries scored a medium 
risk on Political Independence, but Serbia showed a significantly higher score (65% as compared to FYRoM’s 50%). The 
country team reports that the majority of the media in Serbia, including the public service media, are not independent 
and they clearly favour the ruling party (Sucurlija Milojevic, 2018). Political independence of media has the highest risk 
score of all indicators (88%), since the Serbian legislation does not impose any restrictions on any conflict of interest 
between media ownership and the holding of government office. Further high risks are related to a lack of transparency 
and favouritism in buying advertising space in the media during election campaigns, and in the allocation of state funds 
to both commercial and public service media (Sucurlija Milojevic, 2018). In the case of FYRoM, the only indicator that 
scores as a high risk within this area is the Independence of PSM governance and funding (83%). As the country team 
reported, in the past two decades, almost all of the high positions in the public broadcaster were politically influenced, 
and the funding of the PSM has been repeatedly used as a mechanism threatening the independence of the PSM (Trpe-
vska and Micevski, 2018). 
The main causes of risk in the area of Political Independence derive from a general lack of political independence of the 
media, and this results either from the non-existence of regulation to prevent conflicts of interest, or from its poor imple-
mentation in many countries, as well as from other indirect means of political control over the media. Editorial autono-
my in most countries is not well protected either by regulation or by self-regulation, and another alarming indicator in 
several countries is the lack of the independence of public service media governance and funding (see Figure 1.3.2.). In 
general, the risks to all indicators in the area of Political independence are slightly higher in the EU Candidate Countries 
than in the Member States.
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Figure 1.3.2. Political Independence area - Averages per indicator
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POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF MEDIA
This indicator assesses the availability, and the effective implementation of, regulatory safeguards against conflict of interest 
and control (both direct and indirect) over media by politicians, taking into consideration the diversity of European media 
systems and the cultural differences among the countries observed. The indicator consists of six sub-indicators: the first relates 
to the general rules on Conflicts of interest, while the other five aim to capture Political control over the audiovisual media, 
radio, newspapers, news agencies, and distribution networks. Control is here understood as being broader than ownership, 
as it includes both direct ownership and any form of indirect control. Indirect control implies that parties, partisan groups or 
politicians, are not directly involved in the ownership structure, but they exercise power through intermediaries (e.g., family 
members or friendly businessmen). The conflict of interests is defined as an incompatibility between holding government 
office and owning media (Djankov et al., 2003). The MPM, therefore, takes into consideration the existence of rules that 
prohibit media proprietors from holding government office, as well as the situation in practice. According to the public choice 
theory, a situation in which media ownership is related to government, which manages many of the resources that are im-
portant for the media, may undermine both democracy and markets (Dajnkov et al. 2003). At the same time, public interest 
theory sees information as a public good that should be available to everyone, and the government is assumed to be a neutral 
arbiter if private media outlets serve mainly commercial or political interests (Dajnkov et al. 2003). Transparency of media 
ownership and the availability of information on the political affiliation of media owners is therefore a key precondition for 
assessing the extent of the politicisation of control over the media.
The Political independence of the media continues to be one of the highest scoring indicators of the MPM. As shown 
in Figure 1.3.3., the Political independence of the media is at high risk in Bulgaria, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Turkey. Serbia and Turkey score a very high 88 percent, followed by Malta and Romania, 
both above 80 percent. In Malta, there is no law that makes government office incompatible with media ownership which 
has allowed the two leading parties that alternate in government to be among the key players in the media market (Ne-
nadic, 2018). A similar situation is found in Romania, where parties, partisan groups or politicians can be the owners 
of all types of mass media and there are no specific rules on conflicts of interest between holding government office and 
media ownership. As highlighted by the country team, 2017 simply made more visible the degradation, polarisation and 
politicisation of the mainstream media, especially in the context of the protests against the government attempts to water 
down anti-corruption laws (Marincea and Bodea, 2018). 
On the other end of the spectrum, 6 countries acquired a low risk on this indicator: Belgium, France, Germany, Portugal, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom, with Portugal scoring the lowest (as in the MPM 2016). The remaining 16 countries 
performed within a medium risk band, including the FYRoM.
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Figure 1.3.3. Indicator on Political independence of media - Map of risks per country
Methodological note: if compared to the MPM2016, this indicator was slightly revised to ensure more accuracy in the 
results. In the MPM2016 there was a sub-indicator for different types of media (audiovisual, radio and print) which was 
composed of a set of three variables in order to assess the legal safeguards that aim to prevent the media from political 
ownership, their implementation and the situation in practice. The country teams reported this as being too restrictive 
and as potentially overemphasising the risk. To address this concern, the MPM2017 maintained only the assessment 
of the situation, in practice, for each different type of media, and looked at the existence and effectiveness of the legal 
framework to prevent political control over the media in general. This change did not significantly affect the results, it just 
made them more balanced by bringing several countries from high risk to medium risk band: namely, Austria, Croatia, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, and Slovakia. The final three, however, still score very close to a high risk. In Hun-
gary, for example, the Media Act includes provisions restricting political parties and politicians from directly providing 
linear media services, which contributes to a more positive assessment. However, politicians and political parties exert 
influence and control over media via proxies, straw men and oligarchs (Bognar et al., 2018).
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Figure 1.3.4. Indicator on Political independence of media - Averages per sub-indicator
As shown in the Figure above, 1.3.4., the Political control over news agencies is the highest scoring component of this 
indicator and this is due to the fact that, in many EU countries, the leading news agencies are owned and funded by the 
state. There are, however, some good practice examples, such as the Czech News Agency and the News Agency of the 
Slovak Republic. Both operate as public service institutions that do not receive subsidies from the state budget but are 
instead fully funded by its own business activities, which contributes their independence from political influences (Štětka 
and Hájek, 2018; Sampor, 2018). Another model that seems to support independence is noted for Austria, Germany, Italy, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, where some of the leading news agencies are owned by a vast consortium of national 
media companies and publishers. 
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EDITORIAL AUTONOMY
The indicator on Editorial autonomy is designed to assess the existence and effectiveness of regulatory and self-regulatory 
measures that guarantee freedom from political interference in editorial decisions and content. In order to exercise their so-
cial role as the watchdog of society and as a provider of information that serves public interest and debate, journalists have 
to be able to act independently from undue influences. In this regard, effective self-regulation in the form of codes of conduct, 
codes of ethics or editorial statutes, is of particular importance, as well as the appointment and the dismissal procedures of 
editors in chief. The importance of co- and self-regulation, as a complement to the legislative and judicial and/or adminis-
trative mechanisms, is emphasised in the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (2010). The pluralism of the media itself is 
insufficient to ensure the freedom of information if the independence of the practice of journalism is not guaranteed. The 
Council of Europe’s Recommendation on media pluralism and the diversity of media content (CM/Rec(2007)2) therefore 
highlights that, while encouraging the media to supply the public with diverse and inclusive media content, member states 
should also respect the principle of editorial independence.
The freedom of journalists and editors to make decisions without interference from the owners of a publication, their po-
litical leanings, or outside political pressures, should be a paramount condition for a free and plural media environment. 
According to MPM2017’s results, this is not the case in 25 of the 31 countries under examination: 16 countries scored 
a medium risk, of which 8 were very close to the high band (Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovenia, 
Spain and the United Kingdom); and editorial autonomy is at high risk in 9 countries (Croatia, Czech Republic, Greece, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Turkey). While the results are largely in line with the MPM 2016, the 
risk level has slightly decreased for Austria and Slovakia because, in 2017, there were no new cases reported of political 
interference in appointments and/or the dismissals of editors-in-chief. 
Croatia and Turkey continue to be the highest scoring countries for this indicator. In Croatia, the country analysis re-
ports systematic cases of political interference in the appointment and dismissal of editors-in-chief, and there are neither 
safeguards nor efficient self-regulation to prevent this interference (Bilic et al., 2018). As emphasised by the country 
team, this is particularly visible in the case of the PSM (Croatian Radiotelevision - HRT), where dozens of editors and 
journalists are often dismissed immediately following parliamentary elections. In Turkey, the situation is so severe that it 
is hardly comparable to any other monitored country. Continual extensions of the state of emergency and the changes in 
the political system have strengthened the political capture of media outlets in the country (Inceoglu et al., 2018). 
Figure 1.3.5. Indicator on Editorial autonomy - Map of risks per country
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The indicator on Editorial autonomy is composed of two sub-indicators: one focusing on specific safeguards and prac-
tices related to the appointment and dismissal of editors-in-chief; and the other capturing the existence and effectiveness 
of self-regulatory measures, such as journalistic codes and codes of ethics, that stipulate editorial independence in both 
traditional and online news media. On average, the sub-indicator on Editors-in-chief is more at risk (see Figure 1.3.6) 
than that on Self-regulation.
While a vast majority of countries have no common regulatory safeguards with which to guarantee autonomy when 
appointing and dismissing editors-in-chief, leading news media in most of the countries observed do have some form 
of self-regulation that emphasises editorial independence. Exceptions are Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Greece, 
Ireland, Malta, the UK and Turkey, where self-regulation at the level of media companies either does not exist, or it does 
not encompass leading media organisations, or it is just not made publicly available.
Figure 1.3.6. Indicator on Editorial autonomy - Averages per sub-indicator
With regard to editorial independence in practice, as in 2016, most countries (24 of the 31 examined) score either a 
medium or a high risk. Political interference in editorial autonomy is a risk difficult to assess due to its complexity and 
to all of the subtle means of exercising it. In order to ensure the maximum level of objectivity, the assessments provided 
by the country teams on this matter therefore underwent peer-review by a group of multi-level stakeholders in each of 
the monitored countries. Here, it is also worth mentioning that the majority of countries that score a medium or a high 
risk to Editorial autonomy, also score a medium or high risk to the Political independence of the media. For instance, 
Latvia, Malta, Romania, and Turkey scored a high risk on both indicators. In the two EU candidate countries which 
have implemented the MPM for the first time, Editorial autonomy is at medium risk. In FYRoM, during the rule of the 
previous nationalist-populist government, all types of media organisations were at high risk of political interference in 
editorial policy, but there has been some improvement since the political change in 2017 (Trpevska and Micevski, 2018). 
In Serbia, there are systematic cases of political influence on the editorial content and in the appointment and dismissal 
of editors-in-chief, despite legal safeguards being available (Sucurlija Milojevic, 2018).
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MEDIA AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTORAL PROCESS
The indicator Media and democratic electoral process assesses the existence and implementation of a regulatory and self-reg-
ulatory framework for the fair representation of different political actors and viewpoints on PSM and private channels, espe-
cially during electoral campaigns. The indicator also takes into consideration the regulation of political advertising, and its 
implementation in practice. The focus is on the risks from bias in the audiovisual media, since television remains the main 
source of news for citizens in the EU (Standard Eurobarometer, 88). However, the continuous rise of online sources and plat-
forms as resources for news (SE, 88), and as channels for more direct and less controlled political marketing, call for a deeper 
examination of the related practice and the regulation that is available.
As regards audiovisual media bias, especially during electoral campaigns, the vast majority of countries scored a low risk 
(23 of 31), including FYRoM. Five countries are found to be at medium risk (Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovenia, 
and Spain), and 3 are at high risk (Hungary, Serbia, and Turkey). Hungary and Turkey retain the high risk level that had 
already been identified in the previous year’s Monitor examination (see CMPF, 2017). Serbia joins them as, even though 
Serbian media laws prescribe rules on the fair representation of political parties and on their access to airtime on the 
PSM channels, which are applicable to all types of political elections, these provisions are not fully enforced in practice 
(Sucurlija Milojevic, 2018). Furthermore, as the country team stated, access to airtime in the private media is not guar-
anteed, and some political actors are clearly favoured over others, with different and preferential treatment also being 
provided in relation to selling advertising space during an election campaign. 
Figure 1.3.7. Indicator on Media and democratic electoral process - Map of risks per country
The MPM2017 analysis has shown that in all of the countries the law imposes rules to ensure the fair representation of 
political viewpoints in news and informative programmes on PSM channels and services. It is, however, less common for 
such regulation and/or self-regulatory measures to exist for private channels and services. Despite the generally available 
rules on PSM impartiality, even these are not always respected in practice. Some cases of PSM bias have been noted in 
Croatia, FYRoM, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia, while in Hungary, Poland, Spain 
and Turkey different groups of political actors and/or political viewpoints are represented in a biased way, clearly favour-
ing some political actors, and/or viewpoints, over others.
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A novelty within this 2017 indicator is the introduction of a new variable that aims to assess the existence of legislation 
that prevents certain political actors from capturing online political communication by buying and targeting online polit-
ical advertising in a non-transparent manner. The question posed is: is there a regulation that aims to ensure the fairness 
and transparency of online political advertising during electoral campaigns? According to the MPM 2017’s results, only 
nine countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal and Sweden) at present have 
some kind of legislation or guidelines that require the transparency of online political advertisements. In all these cases, 
it is the general law on political advertising during electoral period that directly applies also to the online dimension.
In 2017, parliamentary elections were held in the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Malta, the United Kingdom and Germany. In 
most of these countries this did not affect the overall scoring of the indicator. The indicator Media and democratic elec-
toral process therefore continues to obtain, on average, the lowest risk score across the 31 European countries in relation 
to the area of Political independence. However, it is important to note that, apart from the newly added variable address-
ing the regulatory framework for online political advertising, the focus of this indicator is still on audiovisual media. 
Future editions of the MPM will introduce a new set of measures through which to better assess the roles of online media 
and intermediaries in electoral processes. 
Figure 1.3.8. Indicator on Media and democratic electoral process - Averages per sub-indicator
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STATE REGULATION OF RESOURCES AND SUPPORT TO MEDIA SECTOR
This indicator assesses the legal and practical situation in relation to the distribution of state managed resources for the 
media. In a situation where media organisations face economic difficulties that are caused by recent economic crisis and 
ongoing technological disruption, financial support from the state can be crucial, especially for non-profit, community media 
and other less commercial forms of journalism. It is therefore of particular importance that fair and transparent rules on the 
distribution of state resources and support are in place, as well as their being effectively implemented. The lack of clear and 
transparent rules may be conducive to favouritism. The lack of available data on allocation, in practice, is also seen to be a 
potential risk, since the lack of transparency can conceal a practice of channelling money to specific media outlets in a biased 
manner.
Four countries scored a high risk for the indicator on the State regulation of resources and support to the media sector: 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovenia, and Turkey, (which are the same countries as in MPM2016). 12 countries are in the medium 
risk band, and the largest number of countries (15) scored a low risk. These results roughly correspond to the MPM 2016. 
Some differences are recorded for Luxembourg, where the assessment for the distribution of state advertising to media 
outlets rose  from a medium to a high risk, and for Greece, where it moved in the opposite direction (from a high to a 
medium risk). The reason for the more positive assessment for Greece, as reported by the country team, are the recent 
legislative amendments that have introduced administrative fines for failing to comply with the criteria for the distribu-
tion of state advertising, more precisely for failing to respect that a minimum of 30% of the advertising budget is allocated 
to regional media.
Figure 1.3.9. Indicator on State regulation of resources and support to media sector - Map of risks per country
This indicator is composed of three sub-indicators: Spectrum allocation, Government subsidies, and Rules on state ad-
vertising. The sub-indicator on Spectrum allocation, which assesses the existence and implementation of the legal frame-
work that enacts the general regulatory principles and policy objectives of the Radio Spectrum Policy Programme (2012), 
continues to be at low risk for the vast majority of countries. Most have effective regulation and no disputes have recently 
been recorded on this matter. However, there are a few exceptions: Greece (see also MPM2016), Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, 
Slovenia, Spain and Turkey. 
CENTRE FOR MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM - Results52
The European Court of Justice (Case C-376/13 European Commission v Bulgaria Judgment of the Court (Ninth Cham-
ber) of 23 April 2015) ruled that the procedure for the authorisations for digital terrestrial TV in Bulgaria was based on 
disproportionately restrictive award conditions, leading to the exclusion of potential candidates. In Italy, the government 
overruled a decision of the media authority (Brogi, 2018). 
The second component of this indicator is related to the allocation of state subsidies to the media, both direct and indi-
rect. Direct state subsidies can be, for example, cash grants and interest-free loans, while indirect state subsidies include 
tax exemptions, and reduced postal service and telephone rates. The logic of the MPM is that, if there are subsidies, there 
should be fair and transparent rules for their distribution. Otherwise, there is a risk of favouritism. On average, as in 
MPM2016, countries scored a low risk on this sub-indicator, with a few exceptions that perform within a medium/high 
risk band: Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland, and Slovenia. These medium risks, here, mainly result from a 
lack of legislation that provides fair and transparent rules for the distribution of state subsidies to media outlets.
Finally, as in the previous round of monitoring, state advertising persists in being the most problematic issue for most 
countries, and it is the highest scoring component of this indicator (Figure 1.3.10.). For the purpose of the MPM, state 
advertising is described as any advertising paid for by governments (national, regional, local) and state-owned institu-
tions and companies to the media. Most countries (21), amongst which are Serbia and FYRoM, scored a high risk be-
cause they lack the legislation to ensure fair and transparent rules on the distribution of state advertising to media outlets, 
and this is also reflected, in practice, through low transparency in relation to the distribution criteria, the amounts and 
the beneficiaries. High risks in relation to state advertising continue to be present to a greater extent in new democracies 
(CEE) than in the other members of the EU.
Figure 1.3.10. Indicator on State regulation of resources and support to media sector - Averages per sub-indicator
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INDEPENDENCE OF PSM GOVERNANCE AND FUNDING
The Independence of PSM governance and funding indicator is designed to measure the risks which stem from appointments 
procedures for top management positions in the public service media, and the risks arising from the PSM funding mech-
anisms and procedures. The reasons behind giving a special focus to PSM are twofold, and they emerge from its perceived 
special role in society and its relationship with the state (CMPF, 2016). PSM systems are usually established by the state, 
which, in some cases, still has an influence over them. Given that the PSM are thought of as being media that are both owned 
by the public and responsible to it, that are characterised by nationwide access, and that produce content for all communities 
(Smith, 2012), it is feared that the PSM that are under political influence will no longer fulfil the above-mentioned roles. 
Specifically, it is feared that this will produce biased content and reduce the ability of citizens to make informed choices. In 
order to secure its independence, it has frequently been suggested that the state should have only a minimal ability to interfere 
with the appointment procedures to its boards and to exert influence by funding (Bardoel and Haensen, 2008; Benson and 
Powers, 2011; Council of Europe, 2012; Hanretty, 2009; Papatheodorou and Machin, 2003).
As the map below (Figure 1.3.11.) shows, there is somehow a clear division when it comes to the scoring of the indicator 
on the Independence of public service media governance and funding. Among the lowest scoring countries are those 
located in Western Europe: The United Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, together with Den-
mark, Estonia, Lithuania, Portugal, and Sweden. Among the high risk scoring countries are those that are mostly the 
central-eastern European states: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, FYRoM, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slo-
vakia, and Slovenia. High risk is also recorded for Finland, Italy, Greece, Malta, Cyprus, and Turkey, while five countries 
(Latvia, Luxembourg, Spain, Austria, Ireland) perform with a medium risk on the Independence of the PSM.
The most noticeable change of risk between the MPM2017 and the MPM2016 is in the case of Bulgaria, which moved 
from being at low risk on this indicator to the high risk level. This worsening is related to amendments in the Radio and 
Television Act which allow for indefinite extension of the regular 3-year mandates of the directors general and the man-
agement boards of the PSM in cases when the term of office is completed, and a new Director General is not elected by 
the media authority (CEM) (Spassov et al., 2018). These amendments, as highlighted by the country team, have legalised 
a delay of over  a year in the appointment of a new Director General of Bulgarian National Television. The situation has 
deteriorated also in Croatia, where the Supervisory Committee of the PSM was dismissed by the Parliament before the 
end of its mandate, following the Committee’s 2016 report in which it exposed many irregularities in the PSM’s manage-
ment (Bilic et al., 2018).
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Figure 1.3.11. Indicator on Independence of PSM governance and funding - Map of risks per country
This indicator consists of three sub-indicators: one looking at the risks arising from PSM funding, and two assessing the 
risks stemming from both appointments to the PSM management boards and the appointment of the director general. 
As shown in the figure below (Figure 1.3.12.) generally, risks are more related to the appointment procedures than to 
PSM financing. In the majority of countries, appointment procedures for the management of PSM lack proper safeguards 
and remain vulnerable to political influence. While selection and appointment procedures are often run by special com-
mittees, or media authorities, final approvals are, in many cases, given by parliamentary vote or by the government (a 
competent Minister).
Figure 1.3.12. Indicator on Independence of PSM governance and funding - Averages per sub-indicator
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1.4 ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL INCLUSIVENESS AREA
The Social Inclusiveness area examines the access to the media by various social and cultural groups, such as minorities, 
local/regional communities, people with disabilities, and women. The access of different social groups to the media is a key 
aspect of a participatory media system and it is a core element of media pluralism. In addition, the Monitor considers media 
literacy to be a precondition for using media effectively. The area covers the following indicators:
●  Access to media for minorities 
●  Access to media for local/regional communities and community media
●  Access to media for people with disabilities
●  Access to media for women
●  Media literacy
In the area of Social Inclusiveness, two thirds of the countries (21) are in the medium risk band. 6 countries scored a high 
risk (Bulgaria, Cyprus, FYRoM, Greece, Luxembourg, and Turkey) and 4 countries are in the low risk band (Denmark, 
France, the Netherlands, and Sweden). In comparison to the results of the MPM2016, Belgium and the United Kingdom 
went from scoring a low to scoring a medium risk, and Luxembourg, Cyprus, and Bulgaria from scoring a medium to 
scoring a high risk, while the remainder of the countries remained at their previous risk level. However, it should be not-
ed that the results of the MPM2017 in this area are not fully comparable to those of the MPM2016 as, even though there 
were no changes in the indicator-level, several changes have been made at the sub-indicator and variable-levels.42 These 
refinements of individual variables generally do not affect the relationship between the indicators, but they do result in 
the higher scoring of individual indicators. 
Figure 1.4.1. Social Inclusiveness area - Map of risks per country
42  More detailed explanations of the modifications introduced in this area are described under the respective indicators’ chapters and in 
the Methodology section of the report
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As in 2016, the highest scoring indicators of the area on Social Inclusiveness are: Access to the media for women, and 
Access to the media for minorities. The difference is that, in 2017, the risk levels have increased for both indicators, and 
especially for the Access to the media for women, which has now entered the high risk band (both indicators scored as 
being at medium risk in 2016). As noted above, this is, to some extent, related to the refinements introduced within the 
indicators, which required a more detailed assessment at the national level. For the other three indicators, also slightly 
refined, the risk remained at the medium level, although with a slightly increased percentage if compared to the previous 
round of the MPM (see Figure 1.4.2.). 
Figure 1.4.2. Social Inclusiveness area - Averages per indicator
The results for the two countries that were monitored for the first time in 2017, FYRoM and Serbia, suggest reasons for 
concern. In FYRoM the area of Social Inclusiveness scored a high risk (69%), and this resulted from insufficient access 
to the media for people with disabilities, women and marginalised communities, and also from the poor state of media 
literacy (Trpevska and Micevski, 2018). In Serbia, Social Inclusiveness is on the border between a medium and a high 
risk. Again, media literacy is underdeveloped and minorities, people with disabilities and women do not have easy access 
to media (Sucurlija Milojevic, 2018).
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ACCESS TO MEDIA FOR MINORITIES
The Monitor assesses minorities’ access to airtime on public service media, both in terms of legal safeguards and in practice. 
It further assesses whether the minorities have access to airtime on private TV and radio, and it takes into account both those 
minorities that are legally recognised and those that are not. Variables have been elaborated on the basis of CoE and OSCE 
documents. The OSCE’s Oslo Recommendations43 (p. 6) states: “Persons belonging to national minorities should have access 
to broadcast time in their own language on publicly funded media. At national, regional and local levels the amount and 
quality of time allocated to broadcasting in the language of a given minority should be commensurate with the numerical 
size and concentration of the national minority and appropriate to its situation and needs.” The Council of Europe’s European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Council of Europe 1992, Article 11) and its Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities, which emphasises that the Convention Parties shall ensure, within the framework of their 
legal systems, that persons belonging to a national minority are not discriminated against but are facilitated in their access 
to the media (Council of Europe, 1995, Article 9).
For the purpose of the MPM, ‘’minority’’ is defined as a cultural or social group that is: 
• numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, 
• smaller than the majority group in the respective country; 
• in a non-dominant position, 
• whose members possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the popula-
tion.
The composition of this indicator in the MPM 2017 was refined, based on observations during the previous rounds of imple-
mentation and following discussions with country teams. Several variables have been eliminated and new ones introduced. 
The aim of the changes was, on the one hand, to improve the distinction between minorities that are legally recognised and 
those that are not. On the other hand, a clearer separation was made between access for minorities to the PSM and to private 
broadcasters. 
For the second consecutive year, the results on the indicator Access to media for minorities show that this is one of 
the highest risk level indicators in the area of Social Inclusiveness, and it is among the top risk scores across all of the 
Monitor’s areas. In the great majority of countries, namely, 17, minorities seem not to have adequate access to airtime, 
which results in a high risk score. 9 countries score a medium risk (the Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Italy, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark and France), and only 5 acquire a low risk level: Estonia, FYRoM, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
and Lithuania, with the latter is on the border with the medium risk level. These low risks represent the assessments of 
local experts, according to which most minorities have adequate access to airtime on the PSM and on private channels 
in those countries. 
43  OSCE (1998) The Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities & Explanatory Note. https://www.
osce.org/hcnm/oslo-recommendations 
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Figure 1.4.3. Indicator on Access to media for minorities - Map of risks per country
The indicator on Access to media for minorities contains two sub-indicators: one examines whether minorities (both 
those legally recognised and those not recognised by the law) have access to private TV and radio channels; while the 
other assesses the situation in relation to public service media: whether the law guarantees access to airtime on the PSM 
channels to legally recognised minorities, and whether minorities (both those legally recognised and those minorities 
not recognised by the law) have access to it in practice. 
Higher risk scores are related to insufficient access to private TV and radio for minorities. In 9 countries (Austria, Cro-
atia, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Serbia, Slovenia and Turkey) most minorities, be they recognised or not by law, 
do not have access to airtime on commercial broadcasters, or the airtime they have is not proportional to the size of their 
populations in the country.
However, it is of even higher concern that many of the public service media perform with a medium risk level, consid-
ering their remit and role in society. More than one third of the countries (12) do not have legal guarantees of access to 
airtime on the PSM for minorities. In practice, in 9of 31 countries, most legally recognised minorities do not have access 
to airtime, or the access that they are granted is not proportional to the size of their populations. In a further 10 countries 
there are no legally recognised minorities, or, as is the case in Bulgaria, the law does not differentiate between ‘recognised’ 
and ‘not recognised’ minorities. In 8 countries (Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal 
and Romania), national news on PSM is not available in any of the minority languages. Only in four countries (the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, the Netherlands and Slovakia), according to the data collected by country teams, do minorities have 
access to the PSM, without any significant exception. On a specific variable that seeks to evaluate whether minorities, 
which are not recognised by law, have access to airtime on the PSM channels in practice, 23 countries scored a medium 
or a high risk. 
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Figure 1.4.4. Indicator on Access to the media for minorities - Averages per sub-indicator
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ACCESS TO MEDIA FOR LOCAL/REGIONAL COMMUNITIES AND COMMUNITY 
MEDIA
Media at the regional and local level are particularly important for democracy, since their relationship with local audiences 
tends to be closer if compared to national media. That proximity is confirmed by both the user statistics and by the level of 
the participation of users in the media. Regional and local media can also serve as alternative spaces for discussion for those 
identities and languages that are marginalised by the national media. A solid regulatory framework and support measures 
can help regional media in their democratic mission (Cappello et al., 2016). This is becoming increasingly important now, 
when more and more local and regional newspapers and broadcasters are struggling to survive. 
Community media are also critical in ensuring media pluralism, and they are an indicator of a sound democratic society. 
They tend to focus on local issues and can contribute to facilitating local discussions (UNESCO, 2017). In the MPM, commu-
nity media are defined as media that are non-profit and that are accountable to the community that they seek to serve. They 
are open to participation by the members of the community for the creation of content. As such, they are a distinct group 
within the media sector, alongside commercial and public media. Community media are addressed at specific target groups 
and social benefit is their primary concern.
This MPM indicator assesses whether local and regional communities are guaranteed access to the media, both in terms of le-
gal safeguards and of policy or financial support. It also covers community media, both from the point of view of the legal and 
practical guarantees of access to media platforms and independence, as well as in terms of policy measures. In comparison 
to the MPM 2016, only a few changes were made to the variables of this indicator. Most of these related to the formulation 
of questions and descriptions. One new variable was added that asked if state subsidies are distributed to media outlets in a 
fair and transparent manner, since, if they are not, this may diminish pluralism. 
More than two thirds of the countries (23) scored in the medium or high risk band (see Figure 1.4.5.), and as many as 8 
scored a high risk (Turkey, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Finland and Greece). FYRoM and 
Serbia perform within the medium risk band. In Serbia, community media are recognised by the law, but the law does 
not guarantee their independence. Furthermore, the co-funding of local and regional media is often carried out through 
a procedure that is neither transparent nor fair. In FYRoM, the Access to the media for local communities and for com-
munity media is just below the high risk threshold. There is no obligation in the relevant law for the state to support local 
or regional media, nor does the state subsidise community media and, as a result, there are only three non-profit radio 
stations in the country.  
Figure 1.4.5. Indicator on Access to media for local/regional communities and community media - Map of risks per country
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As in 2016, the sub-indicator on community media scores a higher risk if compared to that focusing on local and regional 
communities (see Figure 1.4.6.). It assesses whether the community media are guaranteed access to media platforms (e.g., 
by the reservation of TV or radio frequencies for community media, or guarantees of access to networks via must-carry 
rules), whether the community media’s independence is safeguarded, and whether these media benefit from state sup-
port, subsidies or targeted policy measures. Seven countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, 
Luxembourg and Spain) scored a high risk on this sub-indicator.
The second sub-indicator examines whether there are legal safeguards for access to the media for local and regional 
communities, and whether the state supports local and regional media through subsidies or policy measures. The MPM 
assesses whether the law contains specific provisions granting access to the media platforms for regional or local media, 
and whether these provisions are implemented. Moreover, it assesses if the PSM are obliged to keep their own local/
regional correspondents or branches, and if they have obligations to broadcast national news in regional and minority 
languages. The overall results drawn from this sub-indicator show that more than half of the countries (18) fall into the 
medium or high risk band, and 12 scored on the low risk level, with 4 (Austria, Germany, Portugal and Spain) being at 
the minimal possible risk level.
Figure 1.4.6. Indicator on Access to media for local/regional communities and community media - Averages per sub-indicator
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ACCESS TO MEDIA FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
All citizens have the right to access the media and persons with disabilities need this access in order to live independently and 
to participate fully in all aspects of life (European Blind Union, 2016). This is an issue for a large number of people, since there 
are circa 30 million who are visually impaired44 and 50 million who are deaf or hard of hearing Europeans45, which togeth-
er constitutes about 10% of the total EU population. The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which 
has been ratified by over 170 states and by all of the EU countries (European Commission, 2016), stresses that states should 
encourage the media, including providers of information through the Internet, to make their services accessible to persons 
with disabilities; and that they should promote the use of sign languages (Article 21). The Convention also asserts that states 
shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that persons with disabilities enjoy access to television programmes in accessible 
formats (Article 30)46. “Denying access to TV and on-demand content means discrimination on the basis of Article 30 of 
that Convention.”47 At the European level, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD, 2010, Article 7) contains a 
non-binding measure stating that “Member States shall encourage media service providers under their jurisdiction to ensure 
that their services are gradually made accessible to people with a visual or hearing disability”.
The MPM indicator assesses the regulatory framework, including the policies and laws on access to media content for people 
with disabilities, and the availability of support services for people with hearing and visual impairments. In the framework 
of the MPM, people with disabilities are defined as those who are blind, partially sighted, deaf and hard of hearing. The indi-
cator was refined for the MPM 2017’s implementation: several new variables were added to make the assessment of risks to 
accessibility more accurate, taking into account the key issues and the latest developments in this area. Particular attention 
was dedicated to enactment by adding two new variables that asked about the implementation of (i) the policy on access to 
media content by people with disabilities, and (ii) the legislation requiring access services.
As in 2016, this is the indicator that showed the lowest risk in the Social Inclusiveness area, although it is still in the frame 
of medium risk. The largest number of countries (12) scored a medium risk, 11 are at a low risk, and 8 (Romania, Slove-
nia, Greece, Latvia, Malta, Lithuania, FYRoM and Luxembourg) acquired a high risk. The highest risk scoring country 
is Luxembourg, as in 2016, and the lowest scoring is Sweden. While Luxembourg has elaborated action plans to achieve 
several of the objectives of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which was ratified 
in 2011, the outcomes are still insufficient, as the objectives defined in the Convention are not transposed into specific 
national laws (Kies and Schall, 2018). In practice, RTL Télé Lëtzebuerg (which fulfils public service missions), includes 
French and German subtitles for one programme only (the second broadcast of the national news at 20.30), and no audio 
descriptions are available. Sweden, on the other hand, has a well-developed policy on access to media content by people 
with disabilities, and support for people with visual and hearing impairments to access TV is available.
44  European Blind Union: http://www.euroblind.org/resources/information/#details 
45  European Federation of Hard of Hearing People (2011). State of subtitling accessing EU. Report. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
consultations/2011/audiovisual/non-registered-organisations/european-federation-of-hard-of-hearing-people-efhoh-_en.pdf 
46  The Convention establishes that “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that persons with disabilities can exercise 
the right to freedom of expression and opinion, including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas on an equal basis with 
others and through all forms of communication of their choice.” See Articles 21 and 30: Freedom of expression and opinion, and access to infor-
mation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-
rights-of-persons-with-disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities-2.html 
47  http://www.euroblind.org/newsletter/2016/july-august/newsletter/online/en/newsletter/feature/ 
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Figure 1.4.7. Indicator on Access to media for people with disabilities - Map of risks per country
Overall, as shown in Figure 1.4.7., there is a lot of variation across the 31 countries in terms of the level of accessibility 
for people with disabilities. In general, countries seem to perform better on the regulation than on the practice side. This 
suggests that even when there are laws and policies on access to media content by people with disabilities, these are not 
always fully implemented in reality. One country (Latvia) has no policy on access to media content by people with dis-
abilities, and in 20 countries existing policies are only nascent. However, even in cases where there are well-developed 
policies, such as in the Czech Republic, Germany, Malta, Portugal and Spain, these are partly implemented, or only some 
of the policy measures are concretely undertaken. Denmark, France, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom are the 
only countries in which policies on access to media content by people with disabilities are well developed and imple-
mented. In addition, while the vast majority of countries (27) also have a law that requires access services for people with 
disabilities, in almost half (12). the law in question is not implemented effectively. 
In practice, in almost half of the countries (14), subtitles, signing and sound descriptions in the audiovisual media for 
people with hearing impairment are available only on an irregular basis, or in the least popular scheduling windows (me-
dium risk). In FYRoM, no subtitles, signing and sound descriptions are available, as the country team reported, which 
represents a high risk. As regards the levels of audio description available for blind people, 10 countries scored a medium 
risk, and 13 fall into the high risk band, since no audio descriptions for blind people are made available there.
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Figure 1.4.8. Indicator on Access to media for people with disabilities - Averages per sub-indicator
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ACCESS TO MEDIA FOR WOMEN
Gender equality is a fundamental value (Treaty on European Union, 2008) and a strategic objective of the EU (European 
Commission, 201548). The Council of Europe considers gender equality to be an integral part of human rights, inter-related 
with media freedom, including editorial freedom, and hand-in-hand with freedom of expression, to be a fundamental right 
(Council of Europe Recommendation, 2013). However, gender gaps are still a reality in the media sector. The EU-wide study, 
conducted by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE, 2013, p. 59), stresses that significant inequalities, including 
under-representation and career barriers, remain entrenched in the media sector. Part of the EIGE conclusions are confirmed 
by the results of this indicator in previous implementations of the MPM (Nenadic and Ostling, 2017).
The indicator Access to media for women evaluates the availability, comprehensiveness and implementation of gender equal-
ity policies within the public service media; as well as the proportion of women at the level of management, among news 
reporters and in news content. The indicator was slightly improved, if compared to the MPM 2016, in order to collect more 
relevant data, and to make a more targeted assessment of the risks in this area. A variable was added to assess the implemen-
tation of PSM gender equality policies, since poor implementation and the following-up of policies were identified as very 
plausible risks. Moreover, the indicator was expanded to also cover access to the private media. 
Access to the media for women is the indicator with the highest risk score in the Social inclusiveness area (this was also 
the case in 2016). It is the only indicator across all of the MPM areas that. on average for all countries, results in a high risk 
level. This suggests, for the second consecutive year, that women are underrepresented in both managerial roles and the 
content of the media in Europe. Furthermore, the overall risk score has increased, if compared to the MPM 2016 (when 
it was scored as a medium risk, on average), and it is now in the high risk band.  This is largely related to the refinements 
of the indicator. More specifically, the questions posed in the MPM 2017 are more detailed - seeking to evaluate the im-
plementation of existing policies and to calculate the precise proportion of women in managerial roles in both the public 
service and commercial broadcasters. This may suggest that the deeper one digs, the more inequality will be discovered. 
As shown in the map, in Figure 1.4.9, 15 countries scored a high risk on this indicator, and only 2 (Sweden and Denmark) 
scored as a low risk.
Figure 1.4.9. Indicator on Access to media for women - Map of risks per country
48 European Commission (2015). Strategic engagement for gender equality 2016-2019. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/docu-
ment/files/strategic_engagement_en.pdf 
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Public service media have a comprehensive gender equality policy that covers both personnel issues and programming 
content in only 8 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom), 
and in most of these cases, available policies are only partly implemented. In almost half of the countries (15), wom-
en are either not represented on PSM management boards or their share is at 29% or lower. The results are even more 
worrisome when we look at the top executive positions in the PSM (Chairs of Board, Directors) - in 22 of 31 countries, 
these posts are occupied by men. The situation is similar for the private TV companies: in 15 countries, the proportion of 
women among the members of management boards is 29%, or lower, and in 16 countries, executives (Chairs, Directors) 
are predominantly men. It is also important to note here that, in an additional 8 countries, the data on the organisational 
structure of private broadcasters and the composition of their boards was not available, which is seen as a risk that is 
related to the lack of transparency. 
Figure 1.4.10. Indicator on Access to media for women - Averages per sub-indicator
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MEDIA LITERACY
Media literacy is a fundamental prerequisite of an accessible media system, and a core element of media pluralism. People 
need to master media literacy skills so as to fully enjoy fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression and access to in-
formation (UNESCO, 2013). The European Commission has recently put the promotion of media literacy as one of the key 
follow-up actions to the Annual Colloquium on Fundamental Rights in 2016.49 Moreover, the European Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive (AVMSD, 2010) requires both the development of media literacy in all sections of society and the measure-
ment of its progress.50 The Monitor bases its definition of media literacy on both the AVMSD text and the European Asso-
ciation for Viewers Interests’ (EAVI) media literacy study, which was carried out in 2009: “Media literacy is an individual’s 
capacity to interpret autonomously and critically the flow, substance, value and consequence of media in all its many forms” 
(EAVI, 2009). “‘Media literacy’ refers to skills, knowledge and understanding that allow consumers to use media effectively 
and safely. Media-literate people are able to exercise informed choices, understand the nature of content and services and 
take advantage of the full range of opportunities offered by new communications technologies. They are better able to protect 
themselves and their families from harmful or offensive material” (AVMSD, 2010).
The MPM indicator covers two major dimensions of media literacy: environmental factors, and individual competencies, 
which follow the logic of the categorisation used by EAVI (2009: 5). EAVI defines environmental factors as a set of contextual 
factors that have an impact upon the broad span of media literacy, including informational availability, media policy, edu-
cation and the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in the media community. Individual competencies are defined as an 
individual capacity to exercise certain skills (including inter alia cognitive processing, analysis, communication). These com-
petencies draw on a broad range of capabilities, and embrace increasing levels of awareness, the capacity for critical thought 
and the ability to produce and communicate a message (EAVI 2009).
Two new variables were added to this indicator for the MPM 2017, and these are based primarily on discussions with media 
literacy experts that took place at the European University Institute on 3 November 2016. A variable was added to assess 
the implementation of media literacy policies, and a variable asking about the quality of teachers’ training in media literacy 
was added, because poor teaching quality was identified as being a potential risk, both by country teams in MPM2016 and 
by the media literacy experts consulted. Furthermore, the two variables on digital competencies, one on digital usage, and 
one on digital communication, were merged into one, composite indicator so as to reflect the Eurostat methodology (Eurostat 
data is used to score this variable), and because the results relating to the two sets of skills across countries are very similar. 
12 countries scored a medium risk on Media literacy, 9 are at high risk (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, FYRoM, Italy, Malta, 
Portugal, Romania, and Turkey), and 10 showed a low risk (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). These results are largely in line with the MPM 2016, 
with a few exceptions. On the positive side, Lithuania progressed from scoring a medium risk to scoring a low risk, 
due to, among other things, a strategic document on media policy with a strong focus on media literacy that has been 
designed by the Ministry of Culture and approved by the Media Council (which has an advisory function). For three 
countries, namely, Cyprus, Portugal and Croatia, the risk has increased from the medium to the high level. This is largely 
related to changes in methodology, but also reflects the state of play in relation to the quality of teachers’ training in media 
literacy. In Cyprus and Croatia, the training programmes in media literacy for teachers are limited, meaning that they do 
not comprise the study of critical skills, or are not up-to-date with the latest societal changes, while in Portugal, according 
to the country team, teachers are not provided with any training in media literacy. 
49  European Commission (2016). “The European Commission presents follow-up actions from Fundamental Rights Colloquium on 
media pluralism and democracy”. Published: 9 December 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?&item_id=51071 
50  The AVMSD is currently under revision. The European Parliament’s Committee for Culture and Education, on 25 April 2017, proposed 
themaintenance of media literacy measures in the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD). Source: EAVI (2017). Press Release: European 
Parliament Votes for Media Literacy. https://www.eavi.eu/5637/?lang=it . The Trilogue agreement of the 7th of June 2018 has confirmed this in its 
agreed text.
CENTRE FOR MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM - Results68
Figure 1.4.11. Indicator on Media literacy - Map of risks per country
This indicator is composed of three sub-indicators: Media literacy policies, Media literacy activities and Digital compe-
tencies. The first two assess the media literacy environment by covering the quality and implementation of the media 
literacy policy, the presence of media literacy in the educational curriculum, including the quality of teachers’ training, 
the presence of media literacy in the non-formal education offer, and the extent of the media literacy activities that are 
carried out. More than two thirds of the countries (24) either have underdeveloped media literacy policies or have no 
media literacy policy at all. This suggests that there has been no significant progress since the MPM 2016. Furthermore, 
in 14 countries, media literacy is present in the education curriculum only to a limited extent (medium risk), and in 8 
countries it is completely absent, which represents a risk (Bulgaria, Cyprus, FYRoM, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland 
and Slovenia). The training programme in media literacy for teachers is either limited or not even provided in 24 of the 
countries. In two thirds of the countries, the subject of media literacy is absent, or it is present only to a limited extent, in 
non-formal education also, and a similar situation is is seen in relation to other activities that are related to media literacy. 
Looking at the individual competencies, the results for the vast majority of the countries (23) show a medium or a high 
risk, meaning that the percentage of the population that has at least basic digital skills is 66%, or lower.
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Figure 1.4.12. Indicator on Media literacy - Averages per sub-indicator
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CONCLUSIONS
The results of the MPM2017 monitoring exercise generally confirm the highlights of the previous rounds of the MPM’s 
implementation: none of the analysed countries are free from risks to media pluralism. What is worrisome is that the lat-
est findings show either a stagnation or a deterioration in all of the four major areas covered by the MPM, and an increase 
in risk for the area of Basic protection is a particular source of concern. 
Detailed results for each of the 31 countries that is analysed by the MPM2017 can be found in the country narrative re-
ports, which are produced by the MPM2017’s country teams, as listed in Part 2, which relates to the methodology utilised.
Overall, 2017 was marked by events that have had a significant impact on media freedom and media pluralism in Europe. 
The average risk level for Basic Protection has risen, and this is due to several indicators scoring higher risk levels. The 
assassination, in Malta, in October 2017, of the investigative journalist and blogger Daphne Caruana Galizia, makes 2017 
one of the darkest years for freedom of expression for the continent since the Charlie Hebdo massacre of 2015. Caruana 
Galizia’s assassination represents a sad reminder to Europe of the need to keep its guard high when it comes to the safety 
of journalists. As events later in 2018 have once again demonstrated, with the assassination of the journalist Ján Kuciak 
and of his fiancée Martina Kušnírová in Slovakia, in February 2018, Europe is not immune from lethal attacks against 
journalists. At the time of the publication of this report, there was no indication as to the masterminds behind the three 
assassinations. The MPM2017’s analysis highlights that journalists and other media actors are currently facing a series of 
threats and attacks in several of the EU’s countries.
These events, and the findings revealed, should be a constant reminder to EU governments that they have a positive 
obligation to guarantee an enabling environment for journalists, as expressed by the European Court of Human Rights 
in its case-law. States are required to create a favourable environment for participation in public debate by all citizens, 
thus enabling them to express and impart opinions and ideas without fear. The State must not solely refrain from any 
unjustified interference with individuals’ freedom of expression, but must also proactively protect the individual right to 
freedom of expression in the case of any kind of intimidation.
Member States also have a duty to deploy all means to avoid impunity for crimes that are linked to journalism. The 
Guidelines annexed to Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the 
protection of journalism and the safety of journalists and other media actors, state that: “It is imperative that everyone 
involved in killings of, attacks on and ill-treatment of journalists and other media actors be brought to justice. Inves-
tigations into such crimes and the prosecution of those responsible for them must therefore meet a number of general 
requirements. When those responsible for such crimes are not brought to justice, a culture of impunity can arise, which 
calls for particular courses of action”. 
It is, therefore, essential for the EU and its Member States to prioritise the protection of journalists, while governments 
must comply with their positive obligations to ensure that freedom of expression and media freedom are guaranteed. 
Closely linked to the safety of journalists - whistle-blowers’ protection, a theme newly highlighted in MPM2017, is still 
weak in EU Member States. MPM2017 data seem to confirm the need of a harmonisation at EU level of basic rules on 
whistle-blowers’ protection51.
Turkey’s specific situation must be highlighted once again, especially when analysing the Basic Protection area results, for 
which the country scored a high risk in all the indicators. The data analysis shows that not only freedom of expression, 
but also the basics of the rule of law are systematically challenged and jeopardised in Turkey.
The MPM2017’s analysis highlights also some of the other elements that contribute to the worrisome general assessment 
of the score for the Basic Protection area, which relate to a lack of full transparency as regards the procedures and criteria 
that are adopted by digital intermediaries when removing or filtering online content and, in the end, in the application 
51  The European Commission proposed, in 2018, a Directive on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law that should 
ensure a harmonised EU-wide protection for whistle-blowers in regard to breaches of EU legislation in the fields of public procurement; financial 
services, money laundering and terrorist financing; product safety; transport safety; environmental protection; nuclear safety; food and feed safe-
ty, animal health and welfare; public health; consumer protection; privacy, data protection and the security of network and information systems. 
It also applies to breaches of EU competition rules, violations and abuse of corporate tax rules, and damage to the EU’s financial interests. See 
COM/2018/214 final https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/placeholder_10.pdf 
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of the rule of law when it comes to freedom of expression online. This is a crucial topic, raised also at the EU level in the 
context of the debate on the disinformation that is spread by the Web52, in the context of the discussion on the regulatory 
measures to be adopted to combat hate speech53, in the context of the reform of the Audiovisual Media Services Direc-
tive54, and in the debate on measures to protect copyright in the online environment55.
As regards the Market Plurality area, the MPM2017 confirms the trends of previous rounds of assessment. The area 
continues to face an average medium risk, confirming that EU member states’ media markets are highly concentrated. 
Media ownership concentration is one of the indicators with the highest risk within the whole MPM, this year scoring an 
average 66%, and concentration remains one of the most evident barriers to the diversity of information and viewpoints. 
Lack of transparency in media ownership is another risk that was captured by the MPM, confirming again 2016’s trends. 
The results also shed light on the financial constraints that the media sector is facing, especially those of the newspaper 
and radio sectors, which have seen a decrease in revenues in recent years in most of the countries analysed. The Internet 
has challenged the traditional business models of the publishing industry: MPM2017’s results also demonstrate that me-
dia outlets still need to develop new strategies and business models in order to increase their revenues.
Editorial autonomy continues to be a vulnerable indicator, both in terms of political and commercial influences on jour-
nalists. Working conditions that are increasingly poor and that expose journalists to external and undue pressures in 
their professional activity in most of the countries examined.
2017 brought no major changes in the area of Political Independence. Political independence of the media persists in 
being one of the highest scoring indicators of the MPM, and a lack of independence in public service media management 
and funding, especially in the CEE, remains a matter of concern. Moreover, the latest developments suggest a further 
deterioration in the trend: in Bulgaria, amendments in the Radio and Television Act have allowed for the indefinite ex-
tension of the regular 3-year mandates of the Directors General and the management boards of the PSM in cases when 
the term of office is completed, and a new Director General is not elected by the media authority (CEM) (Spassov et al., 
2018). In Croatia, the Supervisory Committee of the PSM was dismissed by the Parliament before the end of its mandate, 
following the Committee’s 2016 report, which it exposed many irregularities in the management of the PSM (Bilic et al., 
2018). 
As in the MPM2016, Access to the media for women is the indicator with the highest risk score in the Social inclusiveness 
area. In 2017, it is the only indicator across all of the MPM areas that, on average, scores a high risk level. This suggests, 
for the second consecutive year, that women are underrepresented in both managerial and content creation roles in Eu-
ropean media organisations.
More than two thirds of the countries (24) under examination either have underdeveloped media literacy policies or no 
media literacy policy at all. This suggests that, even though media literacy has often been praised as being a solution to 
growing disinformation related issues, there has been no progress on this matter since the MPM2016.
The findings of the MPM2017 not only confirm that no EU Member State is free from risks to media pluralism, but also 
show that such risks are increasing, both as a consequence of deteriorating compliance with standards on freedom of 
expression and media pluralism that were taken for granted, and of the development of a new online media environment, 
that challenges traditional legal, economic and socio-political power structures.
The observed risks must be assessed in the specific country’s context and in the specific media and political landscapes. 
Measuring the risks to media pluralism is an essential exercise for the promotion of both media pluralism and media 
freedom. The MPM provides data to researchers and civil society, and it may help policymakers to better understand 
country specific problems; it provides a basis for further analysis and for defining relevant policies in order to foster an 
enabling environment for debate and peaceful democratic discourse.
 
52  See, for instance, the report of the Independent High Level Group on fake news and online disinformation, A multi-dimensional ap-
proach to disinformation, March 2018 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-
online-disinformation
53  http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=54300
54  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/revision-audiovisual-media-services-directive-avmsd
55  Especially, see the debate on the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market – 
COM (2016)593
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2. METHODOLOGY
2.1 THE RESEARCH DESIGN
The Media Pluralism Monitor organises the risks for media pluralism into four main areas: Basic Protection, Market 
Plurality, Political Independence and Social Inclusiveness. This categorisation allows for an assessment that encompass-
es the different components and meanings of “media pluralism”. These areas are assessed according to the scoring of 
20 indicators and 200 variables, in total. The research design of the MPM is based on a questionnaire compiled by the 
national country teams, and these teams consist of experts in media pluralism and media freedom. The questionnaire is 
composed of legal, economic and socio-political questions in order to allow an assessment of media pluralism risks in 
any given country, taking into account the legal framework, its implementation, and the effective conditions of the me-
dia landscape. Legal and socio-political questions are closed, while economic questions ask for a numerical value that is 
formally translated into a level of risk. For a number of particularly sensitive and complex indicators, the MPM employs 
an external peer review system, called the Group of Experts. This group of experts, which includes national stakeholders 
and experts in the area, conducts a review of the answers to questions that require a qualitative type of measurement and/
or cannot be based on measurable and easily verifiable data. Data for MPM2017 was gathered through a structured ques-
tionnaire with closed questions (except for the economic questions, where benchmarks are set in order to translate them 
into qualitative answers – please see the ‘User Guide’ in Appendix I for details). This method allowed for the gathering 
of both quantitative and qualitative data, which proved to be crucial in assessing the risks to media pluralism in the EU. 
Additionally, this method allowed the quantitative analysis of answers and the production of a numerical risk assessment, 
which is essential in order to obtain comparable results across countries. The data is collected using an online platform 
that was developed by the CMPF. The CMPF checks and supervises the quality and consistency of the data collected, and 
of the methodology used.
The final assessment per area of risk is carried out using a standardised formula developed by the CMPF. Each variable 
is assessed by a question and receives a score from 0 to 1, according to the specific answer. The legal questions (yes/no 
replies) are rated 0 or 1. The other variables (three-option replies) are rated 0/0.5/1 according to the band into which 
the reply falls. The overall result is the average of variables of the same question type. The MPM is a holistic tool that is 
designed to identify the potential risks to media pluralism in Member States. The research design of the MPM was devel-
oped and tested during the two pilot implementations of the Monitor in 2014 and 2015. IT mostly focuses its analysis on 
news and current affairs. However, it must be noted that, as in previous MPMs (2014, 2015 and 2016), “all indicators that 
assess the general universality of media coverage and the outreach of the diffusion of information” (CMPF, 2015, 2016 
and 2017) are included in the MPM. “They are considered to be basic indicators that are relevant to the infrastructure 
and universality principles as a whole” (CMPF, 2015, 2016 and 2017). In particular, indicators on access to the media for 
minorities, people with disabilities, and media literacy, are preserved as part of this holistic principle. In order to meet 
the challenges emerging from this periodic large scale comparative analysis, the MPM2076 is mostly informed by sec-
ondary data, collected through a questionnaire, and it is supplemented with primary data gathered through interviews 
and document analyses (e.g., of legal and academic texts), together with the group of experts’ evaluation of the variables 
that are more difficult to measure and/or that required a qualitative type of measurement, and/or showed a lack of mea-
surable and easily verifiable data. As was already discovered from the first MPM’s pilot-test implementation (2014), there 
are many reliable, available materials which can be used as primary and secondary sources, e.g., national laws, case law, 
decision practice, governmental documents, NGO reports, official statistics, and academic research. The secondary data 
analysis, with the cited integrations, has therefore proven to be a useful and effective approach in order to ensure reliable 
and valid findings in the context of this project. 
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2.2 RESEARCH AND FINE-TUNING OF THE VARIABLES
The MPM2017 is an update of the MPM2016 tool. As in previous years, the CMPF, in fact, updated and fine-tuned the 
MPM2016 questionnaire, based on the evaluation of the tool after its implementation, the results of the 2016 data col-
lection, new developments in the field of media, and newly available data. Below is a description of the main changes to 
the MPM2017 questionnaire.
The Basic Protection Area retains its scope, with some adjustments. The main changes in the Area of Basic Protection 
were the inclusion of five new variables, three under Indicator 2 on the Protection of the right to information, regarding 
the protection of whistle-blowers, and two under Indicator 3 (Status of journalists, standards and protection), regarding 
the protection of journalists. In particular, some variables on the detention and killings of journalists were added, in or-
der to collect more reliable data on countries that are facing specific problems in complying with very basic standards on 
the safety of journalists. Some other variables were merged with similar ones for the sake of clarity in the answers (which 
sometimes overlapped) and some other variables were fine-tuned in their terminology. 
With regard to the area of Market Plurality, the main changes were made in Indicator 6 (Transparency of media own-
ership) and Indicator 10 (Media viability). The indicator on the Transparency of media ownership was revised and en-
hanced in order to better capture the level of compliance of the regulation of each country with international standards 
(in particular, those highlighted by the Access Info Europe https://www.access-info.org/media-ownership-transparen-
cy). With regard to the indicator on Media viability, the variables regarding the variations in the revenues in each media 
market is now assessed by taking into account the GDP trends in the last two years.
The area of Political Independence retains its scope. However, based on the experience of the MPM2016 and considering 
growing digital challenges, the indicators within this area have been further developed and fine-tuned. The indicator 
Political independence of the media (renamed from Political control over media outlets, in order to be in line with the 
“positive” names of other indicators and to better reflect its range) continues to evaluate the issue of conflicts of interest 
between government office and media ownership. The second part of the indicator, focusing on political control over 
media, news agencies and distribution networks, has been improved to better reflect media realities. In the MPM2016, 
Political control of the media accounted for most of this indicator. There was a sub-indicator for each type of media (au-
diovisual, print, radio, TV) composed of a set of three variables so as to assess the legal safeguards that aim to prevent 
political ownership, their implementation and the situation in practice. Country teams reported this as being too restric-
tive and as potentially overemphasising the risk. The MPM2017 therefore maintains only the assessment of the situation 
in practice for each different type of media, and looks at the existence and effectiveness of the legal framework that aims 
to prevent political control of the media, in general. This is the biggest change in this area. Another change was made to 
the indicator Media and the democratic electoral process, which assesses the existence and implementation of the regu-
latory and self-regulatory framework for the fair representation of different political actors and viewpoints on PSM and 
the private channels and services, especially during electoral campaigns. In the MPM2017 this indicator extends to the 
online sphere by introducing a new variable that captures whether there is a regulation that aims to ensure the fairness 
and transparency of online political advertising during electoral campaigns. 
At indicator-level, there are no changes in the area of Social Inclusiveness. Changes, however, have been made on the 
sub-indicator and variable-levels. Access to the media for minorities: several variables have been eliminated and new 
ones introduced. The aim of the changes was, on the one hand, to improve the distinction between minorities that are 
legally recognised and those that are not. On the other hand, a clearer separation was made between access for minorities 
to the PSM and to private broadcasters. These changes were made based on thorough discussions with country teams, 
both during the data collection and during a dedicated session at the Final conference in 2016. 
Some variables focusing on the proportionality of access to TV, radio and print were eliminated for three reasons: (1) the 
questions were too broad, asking about all types of minorities and about both public and private media, while not speci-
fying any media sample, (2) most of the MPM2016 countries did not have data on the programming hours that are/were 
dedicated to minorities, (3) these variables were not symmetrical with the first sub-indicator about access to the PSM. 
These changes should allow us to increase the accuracy of the answers and to carry out a more symmetrical analysis about 
access to the PSM and to private broadcasters. The proportionality of access will still be assessed by offering apposite 
answer options under the new variables. 
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Access to media for local/regional communities and for community media: only a few changes were made to the vari-
ables in this indicator. Most related to the formulation of questions and descriptions. A new variable was added that ased 
if the state subsidies are distributed to media outlets in a fair and transparent manner. This addition was made because, 
in 2016, several country teams stressed that local media subsidies are misused by local governments, e.g., to fund media 
outlets that favour their political line, which is clearly a risk to pluralism. A variable on the proportionality of subsidies 
for community media across communities was removed, because it partly overlapped with the subsidy-variable above, 
and because of the very broad scope of the question. The variable asking whether the PSM are obliged to have national 
news available in regional and minority languages was transformed to focus on the practice, as opposed to the legal 
framework (new variable question: “Does the PSM have national news available in minority languages?”), in order to 
avoid misjudging countries that do not have related legislation but that, nevertheless, have good practices. This variable 
was also moved to the related indicator on minorities (see above), considering that this indicator is more relevant to 
access to the media for minorities. 
Access to the media for people with disabilities: several new variables were added to this indicator in order to make the 
assessment of risks to accessibility more accurate, taking into account the key issues and the latest developments in this 
area. This was done in close consultation with both academic and civil society experts working in the field. Particular 
attention was dedicated to enactment by adding two new variables that asked about the implementation of (i) the policy 
on access to media content by people with disabilities, and (ii) the legislation requiring access services. Moreover, a vari-
able assessing the adequacy of information about existing audiovisual access services was added (e.g., a central online 
repository of all available access files for country/language specific programmes as a good practice, or the marking of 
the services in the TV programme, highlighting them in the local or national newspapers where the TV programmes 
are advertised, or the icons or “earcons” used on TV). This issue was considered important because information about 
access services is often lacking, which means that ,even if accessibility is deployed, this is much less valuable if people are 
not adequately informed about it. 
Access to the media for women: several new variables were added to this indicator in consultation with academic experts 
in the field in order to collect more relevant data, and to make a more targeted assessment of risks in this area. A variable 
was added to assess the implementation of the PSM gender equality policies, since poor implementation and follow-
ing-up of policies were identified as being very plausible risks. Moreover, the indicator was expanded to also cover access 
to the private media. Given the major relevance, and in order to limit the number of variables in the Monitor, the focus 
was placed on the representation of women on the management boards of private TV companies (not radio or print). 
Media literacy: two new variables were added to this indicator and these were based on conclusions from the workshop 
with media literacy experts that took place at the European University Institute on 3 November 2016, and on further 
consultations with experts. A variable was added to assess the implementation of media literacy policies, a highly relevant 
aspect for the development of media literacy. Moreover, a variable asking about the quality of teachers’ training in media 
literacy was added because poor teaching quality was identified as being a potential risk, both by the country teams in 
MPM2016 and by the media literacy experts consulted. Finally, the two variables on digital competencies, one on digital 
usage and one on digital communication, were merged into one, composite indicator so as to reflect the Eurostat meth-
odology (in fact, Eurostat data were used to score this variable) and because the results on the two set of skills across 
countries were, in the past, very similar.
2.3 MPM2017 STRUCTURE AND CALIBRATION
All of the questions in the MPM questionnaire are classified as variables. Variables are grouped into sub-indicators, and 
sub-indicators into indicators, which are integral parts of each MPM area. In addition, each question in the questionnaire 
has been classified as belonging to one of the four question types: Legal existence (L-e) questions, which are focused on 
whether or not a particular provision exists in a country’s legal framework; Legal implementation (L-i) questions, which 
are designed to examine whether due process is in place to ensure the effectiveness of the legal safeguard; Socio-political 
(S) questions, which examine the actual practice (i.e., a reality check); while economic (E) questions were designed to as-
sess the risk, based on the economic data that are related and that affect media pluralism (e.g., market revenues, audience 
shares). In order to determine the risk for each variable, sub-indicator and indicator, a standardised formula has been 
applied to the entire MPM questionnaire. The formula was designed by drawing from previous studies in which the indi-
ces were based on a list of questions/indicators where answers were calibrated on a scale from 0 to 1 (e.g., Gilardi, 2002; 
Hanretty, 2009). In other words, in the process of calibration, quantitative and qualitative answers of both a dichotomous 
(e.g., yes - no) and a polychotomous (e.g., low, medium, high risk) nature have been transformed into a scale ranging 
from 0 to 1, assigning values to the answers of the Monitor. Each variable received a score from 0 to 1, according to the 
answer to the specific question, with scores closer to 0 pointing to a low risk assessment, and those closer to 1 pointing to 
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a high risk assessment. Specifically, answers to the Legal-existence (L-e) questions, whose response type was yes/no, were 
coded as 0 or 1. Questions with a three-option reply (low, medium, high risk) were coded as 0, 0.5 or 1, according to their 
risk assessment. The same calibration was applied to the Economic questions (E), whose answers were firstly transformed 
into qualitative replies (low, medium, high risk), based on pre-set benchmarks. 
The MPM allows the possibility to answer by using the options ‘not applicable’ and ‘no data’ to all questions. The option 
‘not applicable’ was introduced in MPM2015 to better capture the specificities of the national contexts and to allow for 
the exclusion of questions which are irrelevant, or which are totally inapplicable to a country’s media system. For exam-
ple, if a country does not have any state subsidy for the media, the questions relating to the existence and implementation 
of the legislation to ensure fair and transparent allocation were coded as ‘not applicable’. This reply option was also used 
with logically dependent variables. For example, if the variable question asks whether there is a law that aims to protect 
the freedom of expression, and the answer to this question is ‘no’, then the following variable which asks about the ef-
fectiveness of the law is coded as ‘not applicable’. All the questions coded as ‘not applicable’ are excluded from the final 
calculation. As the previous implementations have shown, some of the economic data are missing across many of the EU 
Member States, and in order to better capture this information, the Monitor allows the option of a ‘no data’ answer. Fol-
lowing the choice of this answer, the country teams were asked to evaluate whether the lack of data represents a transpar-
ency problem within their national context, i.e., to evaluate whether the lack of data should be seen as being problematic 
in their country. In this way also, the specific characteristics of the national context were accounted for, since there may 
be a variety of reasons why certain data are not available/accessible across EU Member States and Candidate Countries, 
and not all of these reasons may be causes for concern. In order to ensure that all ‘no data’ answers have contributed to 
national risk assessments in the same way, a standardised procedure to assign values to the ‘no data’ answers was devel-
oped by the CMPF. According to this procedure, each ‘no data’ answer was coded and assigned one among the following 
three possible values: 1) Low Risk: a value of 0.25; 2) High Risk: a value of 0.75; 3) Missing data was interpreted as a ‘not 
applicable’ and excluded from the analysis. The number of the ‘missing data’ values was limited, as much as possible, and 
was adopted only as a residual category in cases where comments that evaluated the reason behind the lack of data were 
missing, incomplete, or were impossible to interpret.
In normal cases, the following procedure was applied: firstly, if a local team took a position in the answer, indicating that 
a high risk is present, or, in contrast, that the lack of data is not problematic, the CMPF has followed this suggestion and 
has coded  ‘no data’ accordingly, with either a low or a high risk value. In cases where the answer was vague, or where its 
meaning had to be deduced, the following criteria were considered: a) taking into account the local context: if the data are 
not collected because they are considered to be of limited interest, e.g., because the country is too small to collect detailed 
information, because a particular medium has a very limited reach, etc., a ‘low risk’ value was assigned; b) if there is the 
evasion of a legal requirement to collect the lacking data, a ‘high risk’ value was assigned; c) for questions concerned with 
the audience data and the revenue/market share data: • if the country presents data on audience, but not on revenues/
market share: the market share data is excluded from the analysis, i.e., the answer is given a ‘missing data’ value, meaning 
that the findings are based on the audience variable alone. In other words, the revenue data are considered to be optional. 
• if the country presents data on the revenues, but not data on audience shares: the lack of audience shares data is coded 
as being ‘high risk’ in all cases, since it is the standard reference for the market. • if the country produces neither data on 
the audience, nor on the market share: according to above mentioned rules, the lack of audience shares’ data is coded as 
being ‘high risk’, and the lack of market shares data as being ‘missing data’.
All ‘no data’ assigned values have been double coded, meaning that two independent coders assigned one of the three 
values to each ‘no data’ answer. In cases where the coders disagreed, a discussion was held between the coders until a 
consensus on the final value was achieved.
2.4 MPM2017 AGGREGATION METHOD
The aggregation method relied on approaches used in previous studies (for an overview, see Hanretty and Koop, 2012), 
but taking into account the traditions and logic of the Media Pluralism Monitor project. Specifically, the method based 
on the mean of the item scores, used as the most common aggregation method in calculating indices, was updated to take 
into account the logic of the MPM, which has traditionally relied on the groupings of legal, socio-political and economic 
indicators. Consequently, the procedure for establishing the risk assessment of an indicator was as follows: 1) calculate 
the mean of L-e variables within the sub-indicator, 2) calculate the mean of L-i variables within the sub-indicator, 3) 
calculate the mean of 1) and 2). This is the value of the L within the sub-indicator (the L variable is ‘e’ or ‘i’ according 
to the type of opening question/variable), 4) calculate the mean of E variables within the sub-indicator, 5) calculate the 
mean of S variables within the sub-indicator ,6) calculate the mean of 3), 4) and 5). This is the result of the sub-indicator. 
7) the value of the indicator is calculated as the mean of all its sub-indicators. Finally, the risk assessment of the area is 
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calculated as the mean of all its indicators (five per area). It should be noted that all values were presented as percentages 
for ease of use and interpretation (e.g., a score of 0.46 is presented as a risk of 46%). The results for each area and indicator 
are presented on a scale from 0% to 100%. Scores between 0 and 33% are considered to be low risk, 34 to 66% are consid-
ered to be a medium risk, while those between 67 and 100% are thought of as high risk. On the level of indicators, scores 
of 0 were rated 3% and scores of 100 were rated at 97% by default, in order to avoid an assessment of a total absence or 
certainty of risk, concepts, in contrast with the natural logic of the MPM tool. This trimming of the extreme values, as a 
methodological novelty that was introduced in MPM2016, was developed in a collaboration with Gianni Betti56, Profes-
sor of Statistics at the University of Siena. 
The procedure for determining the risk assessment of variables, sub-indicators, indicators and areas, detailed above, 
allowed the MPM to benefit from a standardised formula for all levels of the Monitor. This enhanced the comparability 
of results among the different levels of the Monitor, decreased the arbitrariness in assessing the risk assessments of the 
various indicators, and, overall, this increased the validity and reliability of the findings. Furthermore, this formula also 
contributed to establishing a better balance between the evaluation of the legal framework (L variables) with the evalu-
ation of the actual practice, captured by socio-political and economic variables. Finally, the MPM formula also enabled 
the establishment of risk assessments which are better tailored to the specificities of the national contexts (through the 
introduction of the ‘not applicable’ and ‘no data’ answers). In this way, the differences between the Member States were 
better captured and reflected in the risk scores. 
2.5 DATA COLLECTION
Given that the MPM’s research design rests on two main methods - a questionnaire and a group of experts’ evaluation - two main 
types of data were collected during its implementation - answers to the questionnaire, and comments from the experts who were 
engaged in the evaluation of the answers.
2.5.1 THE QUESTIONNAIRE
The MPM2017 research network was mostly confirmed from 2016, in an effort, as much as was possible, to ensure continuity, and 
therefore comparability. The questionnaire was answered by national teams that were composed of renowned experts in media plu-
ralism and media freedom in each of the countries analysed, excluding Italy and Malta, for which the data collection was carried out 
directly by the CMPF team. As in previous pilot implementations, cooperation with national teams of experts proved to be essential 
during the implementation of the MPM2017. Firstly, due to the necessity of relying on secondary data, which is often in the native 
language, it was essential to have local experts who were able to collect these data, but also to evaluate their reliability and validity. 
Another benefit of using a local team to implement the Monitor was the ability to build on their access to their local networks, par-
ticularly access to the local stakeholders. Given that one of the objectives of this project is to establish and maintain contacts with 
the relevant stakeholders, local teams’ input in growing the network of informed stakeholders who join in the discussions on media 
pluralism, has been proven to be invaluable. Finally, local teams are fundamental in providing answers to socio-political questions. 
In answering some of these questions, local teams have to provide their expert evaluation, since objective ways of measurement are 
sometimes missing. Hence, having a reliable and independent local team which consists of renowned experts in this field, was crucial 
for the implementation of this project.
56  Gianni Betti: https://www.deps.unisi.it/en/department/staff/faculty/gianni-betti
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2.5.2 LOCAL TEAM LEADERS
Below is the list of the MPM teams for the 2017 implementation:
Austria Institute for Comparative Media and Communica-
tion Studies (CMC)
Joseph Seethaler
Belgium KU Leuven Peggy Valcke
Bulgaria Foundation Media Democracy Orlin Spassov
Croatia Institute for Development and International Rela-
tions (IRMO)
Paško Bilić
Cyprus Media consultant Christophoros Christophorou
Czech Republic Charles University Vaclav Stetka
Denmark Media consultant Kasper Netterstrøm
Estonia Media consultant Andres Kõnno
Finland University of Jyväskylä Ville Manninen
France Science Po Thierry Vedel/Geisel Garcia Grana
Germany Department of Communication Studies and Media 
Research, LMU Munich
Thomas Hanitzsch
Greece ELIAMEP Evangelia Psychogiopoulou/ Anna Kandyla
Hungary CEU/CMDS Marius Dragomir
Ireland Dublin City University Roddy Flynn
Italy EUI/CMPF
Latvia Riga Stradins University Anda Rozukalne
Lithuania Vytautas Magnus University Aukse Balcytiene
Luxembourg University of Luxembourg Raphael Kies
Malta EUI/CMPF
The Netherlands Media consultant Mara Rossini
Poland University of Krakow Beata Klimkiewicz
Portugal Universidade Nova de Lisboa Francisco Rui Nunes Cádima
Romania Median Research Centre & CEU Marina Popescu
Slovakia Pan European University Zeljko Martin Sampor
Slovenia University of Ljubljana Marko Milosavljevic
Spain Universitat Ramon Llull Pere Masip
Sweden University of Gothenburg Mathias A. Färdigh
United Kingdom University of Edinburgh Rachael Craufurd Smith
FYROM Institute of Communication Studies Snezana Trpevska
Serbia University of Belgrade Jelena Surculija
Turkey Galatasaray University Yasemin Inceoglu
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Local teams provided answers to the questionnaire, accompanied by comments in which the rationale for the answer 
was described, and the sources on which the answer was based. This was inserted on the online platform that was de-
signed and further developed during the pilot-test implementations (2014, 2015). The platform allowed for centralised 
data collection and the comparison of answers, and it is an invaluable asset in a cross-national comparison of this scale. 
The platform contains not only the questionnaire and the answers to it, but also detailed descriptions of variables/ques-
tions, suggested databases and methods of measurement, a glossary of definitions, FAQs, and other elements which were 
designed in cooperation with local teams in order to facilitate data collection and to ensure its comparability and high 
quality. Another benefit of the online platform as a centralised data collection vehicle was that it allowed the CMPF to 
continuously monitor the progress of the data collection, in order to verify the quality of the responses, and to provide 
feedback to the local teams on how to review their answers in order to increase their quality and/or comparability. Fre-
quent centralised verifications of the local teams’ answers were necessary in order to ensure that all of the teams had 
understood a question in the same way, that the sources used for the answers were relevant and adequate, and that the 
evaluations of the answers were carried out and were based on the same criteria across countries. In addition, frequent 
validation points have ensured that the final datasets are as complete and comparable as possible, and also that the time-
frame and deadlines for the project were followed and respected. One of the biggest challenges of the MPM, in general, 
is to ensure the validity and reliability of the data, which were based on the evaluations and answers to those questions 
for which no objective measurement exists. Building on the experience of the previous implementations, this implemen-
tation also relied on the revision of particularly sensitive and/or difficult to measure questions by the national experts 
and stakeholders. This part of the research design ensured that the validity of the results was increased, and that relevant 
stakeholders had a say in the project and an opportunity to share their views and opinions.
2.5.3 THE GROUP OF EXPERTS
Already, the procedure for the group of experts’ evaluations is  standard. The process starts by the local teams’ nomina-
tion of seven experts and stakeholders in the national media system. All local teams are asked to nominate specialists 
with substantial knowledge and experience in the field of media, who have a good reputation in their professional com-
munity. The group of national experts is supposed to consist of experts from various fields, namely: 
•	 1 Academic/NGO researchers on social/political/cultural issues that are related to the media; 
•	 1 Academic/NGO researcher in media law and/or economics; 
•	 1 Representative of the media regulators; 
•	 1 Representative of a journalists’ organisation; 
•	 1 Representative of a publishers’ organisation; 
•	 1 Representative of a broadcasters’ organisation, 
•	 1 representative of users’/consumers’ organisation. 
The aim of this specific composition of the group of experts is to ensure that all of the relevant stakeholders are repre-
sented, and their views taken into account. Once the group of experts for a particular country is defined and confirmed, 
experts are given access to the MPM platform and the questions that they are supposed to evaluate. These questions, and 
the local teams’ answers to them, are previously checked by the CMPF team and, if it is needed, are revised in collabora-
tion with the local team. Hence, the answers to the questions that are subjected to the experts’ evaluations are as complete 
as possible and they are motivated by comments and sources before the experts are given access to them. Once they are 
granted access, the experts are asked for confirmation of the accuracy of the country team’s evaluation. Each member of 
the group of experts records her/his agreement or disagreement with the scoring on the MPM platform, or, alternatively, 
they have the option to declare that a specific question does not fall within his/her field of expertise. In a case when an 
expert disagrees with the scoring, s/he needs to provide a short written explanation and a suggestion for an alternative 
score on the platform. Once experts complete their evaluations, the country teams are asked to review the feedback of 
each member of the group of experts and to take their views into account when providing the final answer to the ques-
tions that is subjected to expert evaluation. Country teams do not necessarily need to change their answers if any of the 
experts disagree with their initial answer, but if this is the case, they are asked to explain why they have decided to keep 
their original answer and to address, in a comment on the final answer, any disagreement that is expressed by the experts 
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involved. Although the procedure described above ensures that this part of the methodology is applied to all countries’ 
data in a standardised and consistent way, which increases the comparability of the findings and the robustness of the 
method, several challenges were faced in its implementation. Firstly, a problem was detected in regard to nominations 
in small countries, in which some of the organisations whose representatives were sought did not exist, or where there is 
limited availability. In such cases, exceptions were made, and their group of experts consisted of fewer than seven repre-
sentatives. Additionally, another challenge which was faced was in ensuring the nominated experts’ participation. Given 
that the Monitor’s language is English, some experts faced language barriers, while some others weren’t able to participate 
due to time constraints and previous engagements. Due to the time constraints on the project, the decision was made 
that the group of experts’ procedure was considered finished, either by the fact that all of the nominated experts had 
participated, or that each question has been evaluated by more than half of all experts (i.e., four of seven) by the time that 
the data collection had to close in order that the project meet its deadlines. The group of experts, both as a method and 
as an activity involving stakeholders, proved to be of great value to the project. From the methodological perspective, 
this procedure ensures higher reliability and the validity of answers to particularly sensitive and/or difficult to measure 
questions. Experts also contribute to data collection by providing alternative information and sources, which the country 
teams might not have initially discovered or taken into account. Finally, by employing this procedure, it is ensured that a 
range of opinions from the most relevant stakeholders within a media system are acknowledged and made known. The 
group of experts’ procedure is also beneficial to the project as an activity through which relevant stakeholders are not 
only informed about the project, but are also able to be actively engaged in it. 
2.5.4 ONLINE PLURALISM INDICATORS
CMPF is engaged in a permanent debate with other academics and institutions who are discussing these topics in order 
to find suitable solutions for the measuring of the plurality of the availability and of the consumption of information 
online, with a special focus on the role of the online intermediaries. Several variables in the MPM assess online related 
types of risks:
the safety of journalists, and the violation of freedom of expression online; the ownership concentration of Internet 
content providers and Internet service providers; net neutrality; the access to, and quality of, the Internet infrastructure; 
the use of the Internet, and digital skills. In the Basic Protection area, a specific assessment of respect for the rule of law 
as regards freedom of expression online was requested, as well as an assessment of arbitrary filtering, blocking and take-
down practices by governments and online intermediaries. In the Political Independence area, the MPM introduced the 
variable that explores whether the existing self-regulatory measures consider the online activities of the media and indi-
vidual journalists, or whether media organisations are developing new digital-specific self-regulation in order to increase 
accountability and to reduce the risk of undue influence. The reasoning for this derives from the notion that self-regula-
tion usually offers more flexibility and is adapted more easily than state regulation in safeguarding editorial autonomy in 
the ever changing conditions of the online media environment.
Still, measuring pluralism in the digital world remains a very challenging task, and the best method for measurement 
remains to be found. One of the most pressing issues is the lack of reliable and comparative data that would enable the 
assessment of particularly important issues for online pluralism in recent years, including (Nenadic and Ostling, 2016):
1. Freedom of expression online and the role of ISPs;
2. Net neutrality;
3. The role of online intermediaries (such as search engines, news aggregators and social media);
4. Concentration of Internet service providers (ISPs) and Internet content providers (ICPs);
5. Media and digital literacy, focusing on the ability to interpret and to critically assess online content, as 
well as on the skills needed to contribute to the content production and dissemination.
Finally: the digital safety of journalists and online political communication and advertising during electoral campaigns.
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2.5.5 USER GUIDE AND ONLINE PLATFORM
The existing platform of the MPM tool, which has been developed by the CMPF, contains the questionnaire, the user 
guide, the instructions for the country teams, and it also incorporates the procedure for assessment by external experts 
and a chat option that allows for direct, real time communication between the country teams and the CMPF on specific 
issues under each variable.
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